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**Does Economic Exchange with the US Reduce Anti-Americanism?
Explaining Mass Attitudes toward the “Colossus of the North” in Latin America**

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The sources of anti-Americanism around the world have been much debated and even politicized in recent years. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, many scholarly and popular observers have attempted to understand “why they hate us?” Those on the left blame anti-Americanism on the U.S. history of imperialist aggression in the Third World (Chomsky 2002), while those on the right cite jealousy and religious hate-mongering (Hollander 2004). Others have posted more moderate claims about the lack of democracy and economic opportunity in much of the less developed world and, especially, the Middle East (Zakaria 2001).

In this paper, we shift the focus from the rather extraordinary phenomena of foreign policy aggression, religious extremism, and authoritarianism to the more mundane, but in our estimation far more important, notion of day-to-day economic exchange with the United States. We turn to Latin America, the region of the world that has probably been the most frequent victim of U.S. imperialism over the last two centuries and the “geographic and historic birthplace of anti-Americanism,” to demonstrate two things (Sweig 2006: xv). First, despite the troubled history of U.S.-Latin American relations—relations that grew especially sour during the presidency of George W. Bush—the extent of anti-Americanism in the region has been much exaggerated. Far from an “especially prominent pocket of visceral anti-Americanism,” we find that Latin American citizens hold, on balance, favorable views of the U.S., and this was even the case during the darkest days of the Bush administration (Sweig 2006: xv). Second, we show that economic exchange with the U.S. in a variety of forms—trade, aid, investment, remittances, migration—has important effects on Latin Americans’ attitudes toward the “Colossus of the North.” We argue that the more individuals perceive actual and potential improvements of their material well-being to be tied to the United States, the more likely they are to view the country in a positive light.

Pinpointing the sources of anti-Americanism is obviously of much more than just academic interest. Observers disagree about the practical importance of mass anti-Americanism, with some arguing that anti-Americanism has minimal effects on U.S. interests (Hollander 2004) while others claim that it (1) hurts the U.S. economy through boycotts of U.S. products and tourist services, (2) motivates attacks on U.S. citizens, property, and allies, and (3) leads foreign governments to dispense with the U.S. as an ally (Gould 2009). Notwithstanding these two extremes, we expect at a minimum that mass anti-Americanism could both dictate whether foreign voters choose leaders who are antagonistic to U.S. interests and constrain foreign leaders' responses to strategic requests by the U.S. government (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007: 21). For example, in Germany in 2002, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder used an anti-US platform in the run-up to the Iraq War to seemingly boost his successful re-election attempt. Closer to home, U.S. efforts to create a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) fell flat in 2005 after rejection by many leaders in countries where (as we show below) anti-Americanism runs high. Similarly, the U.S. lease of an Ecuadorian Air Force base was not renewed in 2009, and an agreement with Colombia to allow U.S. use of seven of their military bases has been met with protest and angry rhetoric throughout the continent. We do not wish to cast normative judgment on the desirability of any of these measures or events. Instead, we merely make the empirical point that their probability was surely influenced by mass sentiments toward the U.S.

A Definition and Two Puzzles

We define anti-Americanism as a “psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general” (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007: 12). By defining anti-Americanism as a “tendency,” we capture the fact that mass sentiments toward the

United States fall on a continuum from vehemently anti-American to vehemently pro-American. By referring broadly to the “United States and American society,” we capture an overall summary judgment of the U.S. instead of defining anti-Americanism as a perception of a particular trait of the U.S., such as its economy, foreign policy, values, culture. For example, one scholar defines anti-Americanism as “the expression of a disposition against U.S. influence abroad” (McPherson 2003: 5). We avoid narrowing the orientation of anti- (or pro-) Americanism in this way and thus treat as an empirical question what aspect of the U.S. shapes foreigners’ overall attitudes toward it.

Figure 1 plots the trajectory of anti-Americanism in Latin America across countries and through time, and it provides a point of reference by giving estimates of anti-Americanism throughout the rest of the world. The three-letter grey abbreviations are each Latin American country’s level of *Anti-Americanism* (labeled *Opinion of the United States* in the figure). This is the mean response across fifteen years (1995 to 2009) to the following question from the Latinbarometer survey data series: “I would like to know your opinion about the following countries. Do you have a (1) very good, (2) good, (3) bad, or (4) very bad opinion about the United States?” The thick grey line is a lowess-estimated central tendency of these means for each year. We spread the y-axis out over the entire range of this variable so readers can get a sense of the balance and magnitude of change in overall opinions. The figure also reports, with large black “WORLD” labels, estimated rates of anti-Americanism in the rest of the world. These are from the Pew Global Attitudes surveys conducted from 2002 to 2009. These annual estimates are based on a sample of, at best, 40 countries (and often just 20), but they serve illustrative purposes nonetheless.


of anti-Americanism increased by almost an entire standard deviation—that is, about .3 on the four-point scale or 1/10th of the three-point range. Even when anti-Americanist sentiment peaked, Latin American were still pro-American on average and more so than the rest of the world. The first puzzle is thus “why are Latin Americans pro-USA?”

Despite the presence of these overriding regional trends, Figure 1 hints of important cross-national differences, as evidenced by the modest vertical spread of points around the lowest line. Indeed, an analysis of variance shows that the country-level variance is more than twice the temporal variance. Figure 2 more clearly summarizes the cross-national tendencies, plotting each country’s overall mean across the entire time period, and it does so as a function of physical *Distance from the U.S.*¹ We focus on distance to depict a novel finding about the geography of anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere: a tight positive relationship exists between distance from the U.S. and anti-Americanism. With the obvious exception of Mexico, America’s neighbors to the immediate south (Central America and Dominican Republic) are much more pro-American than South Americans. Moreover, the relationship is even strong *within* South America, as, for example, Colombians are more pro-American than Argentines. The overall correlation between distance and anti-Americanism is +.6823 and without the Mexican outlier it is a whopping +.8570.²

¹ To be more exact, *Distance from the U.S.* is defined as the distance in miles between Wichita, Kansas (which is close to the geographical center of the U.S.) and the Latin American country’s capital city.

² Within South America the correlation is +.6767.

Figure 2: Anti-Americanism in Eighteen Latin American Countries as a Function of Distance from the U.S.



Of course, distance from the U.S. is not itself a causal variable of theoretical interest; it is merely a descriptive finding that calls out for a causal mechanism, upon which we will elaborate later. The existence of this relationship, however, points to the second puzzle. Historically, America’s Central American and Caribbean neighbors have been far more subject to America’s imperialist aggression than South America. For example, between 1898 and 1934, the U.S. intervened militarily in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean over 30 times (Smith 2008: 55). According to the Correlates of War project’s Militarized Interstate Dispute data, while Mexico has been the United State’s principal opponent in hemispheric conflict, the U.S. has been in some sort of interstate conflict with a Central American country 2.5 times as much as with a

South American country (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Ghosn and Bennett 2003).³ More recently, during the cold war and post-cold-war era, America's most visible interventions were in nearby countries, such as Cuba, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama. The second puzzle is thus "why are the historical victims of American imperialist aggression the most pro-USA?"

Existing Perspectives on Anti-Americanism in Latin America

The existing scholarly literature on anti-Americanism in Latin America remains underdeveloped. Much work, as pointed out by Schoultz (1979), is more an expression of the author's personal bias than an analysis of scientifically collected data; the use of survey research is rare. (See Morris 2005 and Schoultz 1979 for exceptions.) Overall, notions of political and economic dependency have dominated scholarly thinking on anti-Americanism in Latin America.

By far the dominant school of thought on Latin American anti-Americanism might be called a "foreign policy legacy" claim (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). The theoretical logic is straightforward: Repeated meddling by the U.S. in Latin American countries' domestic affairs, often with a narrowly defined U.S. interest in mind and frequently accompanied by military violence, has generated resentment by the victims of this imperialism. Starting with the annexation of half of Mexico's territory in the 1840s, the list of wrongs committed by the U.S. is long, recurrent, and (allegedly) continues today. Numerous authors cite the well-known U.S.-sponsored (1) military coups (e.g., Guatemala in 1954), (2) oppressive regimes (e.g., El Salvador

³ Including suspected U.S. government covert interventions and/or coercive behavior of U.S. multinational corporations would only inflate the proportion of western hemispheric U.S. interventions which have occurred in Central America.

in the 1970s and 1980s), and (3) insurgencies (e.g., Nicaragua in the 1980s) as the cause of a deeply felt mistrust and bitterness toward the U.S., with some authors describing a commonly held view of the U.S. as insatiable monster (Crockatt 2007; see also Lance 2009; McPherson 2007; Sweig 2006). Latin American opinions about the U.S., it is alleged, are derived not from mere abstractions about U.S. hegemony (as in Europe) but rather from tangible experiences with its often brutal consequences (McPherson 2007). More recently, scholars have pointed to the ongoing U.S embargo of Cuba and the Bush administration's poorly disguised approval of the short-lived 2002 Venezuelan coup as sources of mass disapproval of the U.S. (Sweig 2006).

A similar set of claims attributes Latin American anti-Americanism to "economic dependency." O'Connor and Griffiths (2006) claim that increased economic liberalization has led to fears of decreases in local and national sovereignty and of U.S. domination of the international economic system. Others attribute anti-Americanism to alleged failures of "neoliberalism" (Mcpherson 2003; Hakim 2006). Many studies of anti-Americanism hold that Latin Americans chafe against the cultural effects of US imports and the "McDonaldization" of their culture (Barber xyz).

Although these two conventional wisdoms hold a firm grip on scholarly conceptions of anti-Americanism in the region, we propose several reasons to doubt them. First, the most drastic interventions by the U.S. into Latin America's domestic politics were partisan and thus of a nature that would not alienate entire populations but rather only portions of a population. In other words, U.S. interventions, especially during the cold war, were often forays into divided societies, with the U.S. picking sides in heated and often violent ideological struggles. Scholarship in the foreign policy legacy tradition ignores the uncomfortable fact that such interventions, while certainly contributing to repression and brutality against the local

population, also served the interests of many locals. For example, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan famously aided El Salvador's brutal military regime in its civil war against leftist guerrillas in the 1970s and 1980s (Danner 1994). Clearly, however, a substantial portion of the Salvadoran population opposed the guerrillas and supported the military's efforts to combat them. Indeed, the military's political wing, ARENA, won four consecutive presidential elections following the collapse of the autocratic regime. Other examples, such as Reagan's support of the Nicaraguan *contras*, Nixon's attempt to "make the economy scream" in Chile so as to induce Allende's ouster, and Bush's thinly disguised enthusiasm for Chávez's temporary dismissal, illustrate that U.S. intervention was supported by conservative stakeholders and thus not universally condemned by Latin American populations.

Second, the evidence that Latin Americans universally condemn economic exchange with the U.S. as a loss-making, dependent relationship is weak. At worst, U.S. economic might seems to evoke ambivalent responses from many foreigners worldwide (Chiozza 2009b). U.S.-owned multinational corporations are often the subject of contempt, yet the acquisition of U.S. products and services is viewed by many Latin Americans as a status symbol (Baker 2009; Bauer 2001; Tinsman 2006). Indeed, there is almost no evidence to support the claim that Latin Americans express widespread opposition to foreign investment and trade from the United States (Baker 2003). Latin American citizens are not coerced into purchasing foreign imports. Much to the contrary, the conspicuous consumption of imports conveys status and cultural sophistication in many social circles, including those peopled by poor, marginalized persons (Bauer 2001; O'Dougherty 2002; Tinsman 2006; xyz Veblen). If anything, evidence suggests that Latin American citizens like liberal trade flows for precisely these reasons (Baker 2009). The notion

that Latin Americans seethe under the weight of America's economic hegemony receives little systematic support from previous research.

Finally, the evidence and puzzles discussed thus far cast serious empirical doubt on these standard scholarly orientations toward Latin American anti-Americanism. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, Latin American citizens are, on average, more favorably disposed to the U.S. than they are unfavorably disposed. Moreover, anti-U.S. sentiment is concentrated not in the historical U.S. "playgrounds" of Central America and the Caribbean, but rather in South America, where direct U.S. military interventions have been far rarer. Indeed, the two most anti-American countries—Argentina and Uruguay—have been among those least affected by U.S. meddling.

International Economic Exchange and Anti-Americanism

We argue that a focus on economic exchange with the United States provides the answer to the puzzles posed above. As a region, Latin America has been the most frequent victim of U.S. imperialism, yet it is also the most economically interdependent with the U.S. Economic exchange can thus explain the puzzle of why a repeatedly victimized region nonetheless expresses pro-American attitudes on balance. Furthermore, the U.S. has much tighter trade, investment, aid, and migration linkages with its Central American neighbors than with its South American ones. For example, in the 18 Latinbarometer countries, the correlation (1) between distance from the U.S. and trade with the U.S. (as a percentage of GDP) is -.93, (2) between distance and expatriates working in the U.S. (as a percentage of the population) is -.82, and (3) between distance and aid received from the U.S. (as a percentage of GDP) is -.53.⁴ The degree of economic exchange thus provides a more satisfying account for why residents of the isthmus,

⁴ The three economic indicators are averages for each country over the period 1995 to 2009. The percentages are logged. N=18.

despite residing in the most victimized countries in the region, are nonetheless the most pro-American.

Why does economic exchange with the U.S. promote goodwill toward the “Colossus of the North”? Given the bias toward focusing on specifically *anti*-Americanism, studies of Latin America provide assistance to answer this question.⁵ Instead, we find relevant theoretical expectations in other literatures, although these other literatures are often vague in specifying the causal channels. For this reason, another goal of our discussion and analysis below is to better specify precisely how international economic exchange shapes mass beliefs about foreign countries.

Findings on the “commercial peace”—that is, the empirical observation that trading states are less likely to fight one another than non-trading or weakly trading states—intimate that economic linkages may promote mass goodwill toward foreign partners. For example, one line of thought within this tradition specifies that cross-national economic links facilitate contact and cultural exchange, promoting tolerance and cross-cultural understandings: Similarly, economic links can reduce uncertainty about motives in international affairs: “economic cooperation provides an opportunity to generate greater trust and confidence” (Cossa and Khanna 1997: 219; Goldsmith et al. 2005; Reed 2003). Finally, economic interdependence increases the number of

⁵ Research on Latin American anti-Americanism continues to focus on mass distaste for U.S. military, diplomatic, and economic hegemony. However, a recent surge in scholarship on other parts of the world has painted foreigners’ views of the U.S. as much more ambivalent and self-contradictory (Chiozza 2009; Kane 2006; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Kroes 2006). For example, some find that the U.S. is resented as a symbol of economic globalization, with many citizens dismissing globalization as “a synonym for Americanization,” yet the global demand for U.S. cultural and durable-goods exports is broad and emigration to the U.S. continues apace (Sweig 2006: 43). While the insight that foreigners are ambivalent about the U.S. economy is surely a scholarly advance, we find it overly vague and non-committal at times, as exemplified in the observations that U.S. “economic and military power ... inspires a complicated mix of envy, resentment, desire, jealousy, love, hate, and fear” (2006: 34). Instead, we seek to adjudicate between these theoretically countervailing expectations about the effects of economic exchange with the U.S. on anti-Americanism.

citizens with a material stake in ongoing exchange and can thus disseminate knowledge of the gains from international exchange with a particular partner (Kleinberg and Fordham 2010; Russett and O’Neal 2001).

Still, the commercial peace literature is not specific enough about public opinion to generate precise arguments about the causal channels through which exchange fosters mass goodwill. For example, the standard claim about the economic effects of trade is that trade produces net benefits and thus foments positive sentiment toward trading partners. Does this effect occur, however, through the export channel or through the import channel? Which promotes “greater trust and confidence,” sales to foreigners or purchases from them? Moreover, does trade matter more or less than other elements of economic exchange, such as investment, migration, remittances, and aid? In short, we propose to move beyond vague statements about the benefits of economic “cooperation” or “interdependence” and specify and test a series of hypotheses about precise causal mechanisms.

The imports hypothesis. The economic gains from trade accrue most heavily through the consumer channel in the form of lower prices, higher quality, and greater variety in goods and services (Irwin 2002). Moreover, these gains have a wide scope because they are spread across much of the population. In contrast to export-channel gains (or losses), one does not have to be employed in a tradable goods sector to be directly affected by imports. Finally, imports often overcome the steep cognitive barriers to attitude influence because many foreign-made goods and services have clear names and labels that convey their external origins (Baker 2003). Indeed, imports are often a conduit of cultural content and exchange. We thus expect the consumption of imports to lower rates of anti-Americanism in Latin America. Stated differently,

the imports hypothesis holds that we should observe a negative association between the volume of import flows and anti-Americanism.

The exports hypothesis. Besides expanding the inflow of foreign goods, trade leads to a proliferation of jobs in the export-oriented sector. Again, the economic dependency literature portrays jobs in exporting industries as precarious and exploitative, and thus a potential source of rage toward foreign purchasers. Yet systematic research suggests that these jobs often pay higher wages than those in nontrading sectors. We thus expect exports to lower rates of anti-Americanism.

The aid hypothesis. Foreign aid is a foreign policy tool of wealthy countries, and a common goal of aid is better public relations—that is, the improvement of foreigners’ perceptions of the donor (Brooks 2004). Indeed, in the face of an (alleged) increase worldwide in anti-Americanism in the 2000s, some observers advocated increases in U.S. aid outlays as a solution (Sachs 2008). Yet almost no empirical research has tested whether aid is in fact effective in shaping foreign public opinion. We thus test the aid hypothesis, which holds that aid from the United States lowers anti-Americanism in recipient countries. In other words, anti-Americanism in Latin America should be negatively associated with the volume of aid inflows from the United States.

The migrant Diaspora hypothesis. International migration is an important form of cross-border economic exchange, and emigration to the United States is particularly important in Latin America. Research on migrant flows is clear that immigrants only rarely sever connections to their homelands. Many migrants send remittances back to their country of origin, and remittances to some Latin American countries can reach 20% of domestic GDP (Brooks 2004). Migrants also create investment opportunities for their country of origin (Leblang 2010). These

economic enhancements to countries of origin may foment the belief in source countries that the destination country is a wealthy land of economic opportunity, and one that is willing to share its wealth via migration channels. The migrant Diaspora hypothesis holds that anti-Americanism should be lower in countries that have produced a large number of emigrants to the U.S. Anti-Americanism should vary with the share of a country's population that resides in the United States.

Elite rhetoric hypothesis. The aforementioned hypotheses all assume that citizens are fiercely focused on the economic gains from international exchange. There is an important strain of research in political psychology, however, that is doubtful that material self-interest plays an important role in public opinion formation (Mutz and Mansfield xyz). Instead, many political psychologists find that citizens arrive at their beliefs on important political and social issues not by reasoning for themselves but by absorbing elite rhetoric (Zaller 1992).

If true, then elite rhetoric, rather than material gain, is the channel through which economic exchange with the US mitigates anti-Americanism. After all, economic interdependence can shape the way that elites talk about a dyadic partner (Hill 1996; Zaller 1992). In countries with strong economic ties to the U.S., elites may think twice before fomenting anti-U.S. sentiments for fear of provoking economic consequences for the overall economy and for particular business interests.⁶ Similarly, anti-Americanism is often promoted by elites who seek to blame domestic shortcomings on external factors, yet elites in countries that carry deep stakes in exchange with the U.S. may think twice before doing so (McPherson 2003; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). If the elite rhetoric hypothesis holds in its strictest form,

⁶ Some have written that the removal of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in 2009 was due in part to perceptions among the business sector that Zelaya's closeness with Venezuela might sour relationships with Washington and/or U.S. business interests (Thompson 2009).

then economic factors should be irrelevant to mass anti-Americanism when controlling for the degree to which elites in a country are anti-American.

Data, Methods, and Results

We use the mass anti-Americanism variable introduced above as a dependent variable in a series of regression models. In the Latinbarometer dataset, this survey question was asked in 18 different countries over a period of 15 years. No other dataset provides such a rich opportunity to explore both the cross-national and cross-temporal determinants of anti-Americanism.⁷ Our statistical analysis stays at an aggregated level: each case is a country year, and we collapse anti-Americanism to its mean for each of these country years. We do this, seeking to explain strictly cross-national and cross-temporal differences in anti-Americanism rather than cross-individual variance, for two reasons. First, whereas we are able to tap various economic datasets to characterize how interdependent with the U.S. each country in each year was, the Latinbarometer survey contains no questions that would enable us to tally how exposed its respondents were to exchange with the United States. The Latinbarometer measures broadly defined demographic categories—such as education level, wealth, and social class—that are insufficient for specifying an individual’s level of exposure to trade with the U.S. and aid, investment, and remittances from the U.S. More precise measures, such as the degree of consumption of American-made goods or the destination of goods and services produced in the respondent’s sector of employment, are unavailable. Given our goal of parsing out the independent effect of these different channels of economic exchange, aggregate level data are far richer in this case. Second, staying at the country-year level allows us to exploit the panel nature

⁷ There are a few exceptions to this. Not all countries were in the sample in 1995, countries were only surveyed once in 1999 and 2000, and the Dominican Republic was not introduced into the sample until 2004.

of the data. Each country’s sample of respondents is fresh in any given year—that is, there are no repeated interviews of respondents, as in a panel. As a result, moving from the national to the individual level would effectively downgrade our data from panel to repeated cross-section.

Variables

We use three independent variables to measure aspects of international economic exchange with the United States. First, we measure *Trade with the US* as total trade flows with the U.S. as a (logged) percentage of the country’s GDP. For Latin American country i in year t , this is

$$\ln\left(\frac{X_{itUS} + M_{itUS}}{GDP_{it}} \times 100\%\right), \quad (1)$$

where X is the value of export volumes in current US dollars, M is the value of import volumes in current US dollars, and GDP is gross domestic product in current US dollars.⁸ Given our desire to decipher the precise channel through which trade matters, we also disaggregate trade into *Exports to the US* and *Imports from the US*, again expressing these as (logged) percentages of GDP. We also address potential endogeneity concerns by employing in some of our regression models an instrumental variable for imports from the US. It is probably the case that Latin American citizens who are pro-American for reasons unrelated to import consumption are

⁸ To calculate this, we first derived $p_{X\cdot US}$, the proportion of a country’s total exports that were to the U.S. (i.e., $X_{it\cdot US}/X_{it\cdot World}$) and $p_{M\cdot US}$, the proportion of a country’s total imports that were from the U.S. (i.e., $M_{it\cdot US}/M_{it\cdot World}$). Both could be easily calculated from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade (DOT) Statistics (IMF 2010). We then retrieved the level of overall trade openness (a.k.a. trade ratios), which is $(X_{it\cdot World} + M_{it\cdot World})/GDP_{it}$, from World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2010). Finally, we calculated trade with the U.S. as $(p_{X\cdot US} + p_{M\cdot US}) \times [(X_{it\cdot World} + M_{it\cdot World})/GDP_{it}]$. Performing the calculation this way, rather dividing $X_{it\cdot US}$ and $M_{it\cdot US}$ (from the DOT) by GDP_{it} (from the WDI) avoided problems that can arise from the use of different exchange rates in the two different datasets.

in turn more likely than anti-American citizens to purchase American-made imports.⁹ If so, then import flows to a country are endogenous to its level of anti-Americanism, and ignoring this fact could inflate our estimates of trade's impact on mass attitudes. To alleviate this concern, we use *Imports from non-US countries* ($M_{it \cdot nonUS}/GDP_{it}$) as an instrumental variable that is highly correlated with the exogenous portion of imports from the US (i.e., the portion that is due to the technological, economic, and policy-related factors that ease or restrict trade inflows) but not correlated with the endogenous portion (i.e., the portion that is due to consumers' preferences for goods specifically because they are or are not American made).¹⁰

Second, we measure the effects of migrant flows with *Emigrants Working in the US* as a (logged) percentage of the local population:

$$\ln\left(\frac{E_{it-US}}{Pop_{it}} \times 100\%\right), \quad (2)$$

where E is the number of country i 's nationals working in the US and Pop is country i 's total population in year t . In words, this variable is the total number of emigrants from country i working in the US as a (logged) percentage of country i 's population.¹¹

Third and finally, we capture *Aid from the US* with

$$\ln\left(\frac{Aid_{it-US}}{GDP_{it}} \times 100\%\right), \quad (3)$$

⁹ One example is the consumer boycotts of American-made goods that occurred after the launch of the Iraq War.

¹⁰ More technically, we use instrumental variables regression to achieve this goal. The procedure first regresses the endogenous variable, imports from the US, on imports from non-US and all other regressors, then uses the predicted values from this regression as an independent variable (in the place of imports from the US) in the subsequent regression in which anti-Americanism is the dependent variable.

¹¹ Migrant stock data are from OECD (OECD 2010).

where *Aid* is official development assistance received from the U.S. Stated differently, this variable is *i*'s aid inflows from the U.S. as a (logged) percentage of its GDP.¹²

We also include two other independent variables to capture very different potential causes of sources of mass anti-Americanism. The first is *Elites' Pro-Americanism*. We measure this with the interviews of Latin America's legislators conducted by the University of Salamanca for the Latin American Parliamentary Elites Project (Alcántara 2005). This project surveys Latin American legislators from eighteen countries once per legislative session, and the questionnaires have contained numerous queries about perceptions of the United States. We construct an index of elite's pro-Americanism that thus contains cross-national and cross-temporal estimates of the slant in elite rhetoric. (See appendix for more details on how we constructed the index.) The second captures opinions about U.S. foreign policy, although it is U.S. policy toward the Middle East, not Latin America. This variable, *Bush during Iraq War*, is an indicator variable equal to one (1) from 2003 to 2008 (inclusive) and zero (0) in other years.

Cross-National Results

We first conduct a set of simple regressions, reported in Table 1, using aggregated cross-national numbers. In other words, we average over all years *t* (1995-2009) and explore country-level relationships with a series of analyses on just eighteen country cases. Given the small number of cases, we report both OLS and robust regression results, as the latter are less sensitive to potentially influential single cases.¹³ The advantage of averaging over so many years is to

¹² Aid data are from OECD DAC (OECD 2010).

¹³ These robust regressions are "bounded influence estimators" that weight each case by the inverse of its influence (Cook's distance) on the OLS regression coefficients.

capture an underlying cross-national propensity to anti-Americanism that is devoid of idiosyncratic effects from a particular U.S. president, international incident, or economic event.

Table 1: The Cross-National Correlates of Anti-Americanism in Latin America

Dependent Variable: Anti-Americanism								
	OLS Regressions				Robust Regressions			
Trade with US	-.318*			-.219*	-.359*			-.239*
	(.073)			(.118)	(.065)			(.111)
Emigrants working in US		-.101*		-.008		-.116*		-.026
		(.032)		(.043)		(.030)		(.040)
Aid from US			-.063*	-.034*			-.073*	-.024
			(.018)	(.019)			(.019)	(.018)
Constant	2.500	2.077	1.903	2.271	2.528	2.046	1.863	2.305
	(.103)	(.046)	(.070)	(.184)	(.092)	(.043)	(.071)	(.174)
Entries are regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. All variables are averages for each country over the period 1995-2009. N=18. * = p < .05.								

Table 1 shows bivariate regressions and multiple regression results. Each of the three measures of economic exchange has a large substantive and statistically significant relationship in the bivariate OLS models and in the robust regressions. (The bivariate correlations in each of these relationships is between -.60 and -.70.) In the multiple regressions, emigration drops below statistical significance, with trade and aid clearly having the strong remaining effects. In short, we conclude that international economic exchange with the U.S. has a long-running positive effect on how a country's citizens evaluate the Colossus of the North.

Panel Data Results

While these results are telling, we also seek to exploit the panel structure of our dataset. We run a set of error correction models (ECM) in which the dependent variable (DV) is annual change in (first difference) anti-Americanism. This variable is regressed on the previous year's level of anti-Americanism, the first difference of each independent variable (IV), and the level of

each IV in the previous year. Coefficients on the differenced independent variables reveal the immediate and “one-off” impact of a change in the IV (i.e., the effect resulting in the year of change’s occurrence), while those on the lag of the IV capture the delayed effect of a change in the IV—that is, the effect over the following year. We choose a random effect specification because we deem it crucial to maintain the cross-national differences in estimating the causal impacts of our IVs. (For example, see Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008 on this point.)

Table 2 reports the results of nine different ECMs, each with a slightly different set of IVs. The most important findings are as follows. First, trade with the US reduces anti-Americanism in Latin America. This is evident in model 1, where the statistically significant coefficient on the lag of this variable shows that overall trade flows have a negative impact on anti-Americanism, although the effect of trade flows on public opinion always follows a one-year delay. Second, the channel through which these benefits from trade occur is clearly consumption. Models 2-5 convincingly show that imports have statistically discernible immediate and delayed effects in fostering goodwill toward the U.S. among Latin American citizens. These effects withstand the introduction of export flows as a statistical control (models 4 and 5) and the use of the imports from non-U.S. sources as an instrumental variable (models 3 and 5). Third, dependency theorists may be on to something in arguing that exports to the US sour Latin Americans toward the Colossus of the North. An increase in export outflows to the U.S. does yield an immediate, positive shift in anti-Americanism. This effect, however, is clearly outweighed by the goodwill-building effects of imports, as indicated by the net benefits of overall trade in lowering anti-Americanism (model 1) and the fact that imports yield not just immediate effects in mitigating anti-Americanism but also longer-term delayed effects as well (model 5).

[Table 2 here]

Fourth, other forms of economic exchange with the U.S. matter, and they do so in ways that also lower rates of anti-Americanism. In restricted models (i.e., with fewer statistical controls), emigration to the U.S. carries positive ramifications for views of the U.S. back home, and aid from the U.S. is particularly effective in fomenting pro-Americanism. Fifth, the least restrictive models (8 and 9), clearly show aid and imports to be the channels through which economic exchange reduces anti-US sentiment in Latin America. The coefficient on aid flows and imports hold up well in the face of statistical controls.

Sixth, despite the existence of these strong economic effects, elite rhetoric also matters. Pro-Americanist attitudes among each country's legislators are negatively correlated with mass anti-Americanism, with elite opinion yielding a delayed effect on mass opinion. Still, the ongoing statistical significance of the economic variables indicates that elite rhetoric is not the channel through which exchange with the U.S. foments pro-Americanism in Latin America. Finally, U.S. foreign policy does matter, as the Bush administration's foray into Iraq clearly raised levels of anti-Americanism throughout Latin America. This still refutes the conventional wisdom about anti-Americanism in Latin America, however, as it was policy toward the Middle East, not Latin American that mattered.

Conclusion

Many Latin Americanists are convinced that the U.S. stokes the ire of most citizens residing to its south. This paper demonstrates otherwise, and further shows that decades of concern about economic dependence and exploitation are misplaced. Instead, Latin Americans living in countries with strong economic ties to the U.S. are more favorable toward the U.S. than

are those living in countries with weaker ties. For U.S. politicians seeking to understand how to lessen ill-will toward the world's largest economy, more trade and aid seem to be effective solutions.

Table 2: Determinants of Anti-Americanism in 18 Latin American Countries, 1995-2009

	Dependent Variable: Δ Anti-Americanism								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Anti-Americanism _(t-1)	-.364*	-.405*	-.487*	-.318*	-.458*	-.370*	-.410*	-.502*	-.541*
	(.079)	(.081)	(.078)	(.066)	(.082)	(.079)	(.082)	(.067)	(.091)
<i>International Economic Exchange</i>									
Trade with US _(t-1)	-.074*								
	(.033)								
Δ Trade with US	.014								
	(.084)								
Imports from US _(t-1)		-.088*						-.032	
		(.032)						(.030)	
Imports from US _(t-1) (instrumented)			-.134*		-.135*				-.045
			(.035)		(.045)				(.073)
Δ Imports from US		-.145*	-.166*		-.174*			-.136*	-.135*
		(.076)	(.072)		(.072)			(.070)	(.076)
Exports to US _(t-1)				-.048*	.026			-.000	.008
				(.024)	(.028)			(.025)	(.033)
Δ Exports to US				.147 [†]	.145 [†]			.161 [†]	.156 [†]
				(.058)	(.057)			(.056)	(.055)
Emigrants Working in US _(t-1)						-.046*		-.023	-.017
						(.021)		(.014)	(.019)
Δ Emigrants Working in US						-.083*		-.048	-.042
						(.041)		(.046)	(.050)
Aid from US _(t-1)							-.031*	-.025*	-.026*
							(.009)	(.006)	(.009)
Δ Aid from US							.011	.006	.004
							(.022)	(.022)	(.024)
<i>Elite Rhetoric</i>									
Elite's Pro-Americanism _(t-1)	-.049*	-.057*	-.059*	-.050*	-.063*	-.068*	-.068*	-.080*	-.076*
	(.022)	(.022)	(.018)	(.023)	(.018)	(.019)	(.021)	(.019)	(.021)
Δ Elites' Pro-Americanism	.022	.025	.033	.007	.023	-.002	-.009	-.016	-.009
	(.040)	(.042)	(.047)	(.034)	(.043)	(.040)	(.038)	(.040)	(.040)
<i>U.S. Foreign Policy</i>									
Bush during Iraq War _(t-1)	.099*	.105*	.127*	.099*	.121*	.102*	.115*	.155*	.163*
	(.033)	(.034)	(.029)	(.028)	(.029)	(.038)	(.028)	(.026)	(.030)
Δ Bush during Iraq War	.244*	.232*	.228*	.247*	.218*	.254*	.258*	.254*	.252*
	(.019)	(.019)	(.029)	(.020)	(.030)	(.020)	(.022)	(.030)	(.032)
Constant	.903	.964	1.210	.705	1.110	.733	.718	.970	1.053
	(.215)	(.203)	(.209)	(.151)	(.208)	(.144)	(.145)	(.156)	(.205)

Note: Entries are GLS coefficients (estimated with random effects) and standard errors (adjusted for clustering by country) in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are averages over 10 multiply imputed datasets (Royston 2004). N=252. * = $p < .05$, one-tailed. [†] = wrongly signed coefficient greater than twice its standard error.

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