

Sincere or Strategic? U.S. Aid and Voting in the UN General Assembly

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The model




Figure 3: Aid Flows to Pakistan, 1984–2001




Table 1: Utilities for Statistical Strategic Model

	$U_R(Punish)$	$U_R(\neg Reward)$	$U_R(Reward)$	$U_{U.S.}(\neg Punish)$	$U_{U.S.}(Punish)$	$U_{U.S.}(Reward)$
Constant	110.53 (32.55)	0.32 (0.06)		4.94 (0.24)		-3.20 (0.13)
Recipient Polity	2.75 (0.64)		-5.63 (1.22)		0.05 (0.01)	0.13 (0.01)
Allies	-30.69 (5.75)		-2.99 (10.64)		0.19 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.14)
Recipient GDP	9.87 (1.84)		4.42 (1.23)		-0.09 (0.16)	0.06 (0.01)
Trade	-15.86 (4.75)		11.46 (5.25)		-0.05 (0.02)	-0.11 (0.03)
Left-Wing Executive	-9.85 (4.50)		14.76 (12.92)		-0.07 (0.11)	-0.44 (0.15)
Right-Wing Executive	6.96 (10.67)		68.74 (14.57)		-0.71 (0.15)	-0.28 (0.16)
U.S. Votes No	-109.71 (32.27)		-6.82 (1.66)		0.22 (0.02)	-0.16 (0.01)

Bootstrapped Standard Errors in Parentheses
 Number of Observations 14337
 Bold Indicates Significance at the .05 Level
 Log-Likelihood 6923.28
 Percent Correctly Predicted: 84.9%
 Modal Percent Correctly Predicted: 63.2%

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
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
Table 1: Substantive Effects on Rewards and Punishments

	Pr(<i>Punish</i>)	Change in Pr	% Change in Pr	Pr(<i>Reward</i>)	Change in Pr	% Change in Pr
Median Values	0.042	NA		0.008	NA	
Polity=-9	0.028	-0.014	-33%	0.003	-0.005	-63%
Polity=9	0.071	+0.029	+69%	0.029	+0.021	+263%
Recipient GDP=1,000	0.051	+0.009	+21%	0.007	-0.001	-13%
Recipient GDP=12,000	0.020	-0.022	-52%	0.013	+0.005	+63%
Trade=15 million	0.042	+0.000	+0%	0.008	+0.000	+0%
Trade=10 billion	0.040	-0.002	-5%	0.007	-0.001	-13%
Left-Wing	0.039	-0.003	-7%	0.005	-0.003	-38%
Right-Wing	0.021	-0.021	-50%			
Yes Vote	0.005	-0.037	-88%	0.042	+0.035	+438%

Democracy, Development & Punishment



Democracy, Wealth & “Yes” Votes



Democracy, Wealth & “No” Votes




Table 1: Substantive Effects on Votes against the U.S.

	$\text{Pr}(\textit{Vote Against U.S.})$	Change in Pr	% Change in Pr
Median Values	0.880	NA	
Polity=-9	0.942	+0.062	+7%
Polity=9	0.821	-0.059	-7%
Alliance=1	0.960	+0.080	+9%
GDP=1,000	0.946	+0.066	+8%
GDP=12,000	0.695	-0.185	-21%
Trade=15 million	0.878	-0.002	-0%
Trade=10 billion	0.928	+0.048	+5%
Left-Wing	0.906	+0.026	+3%
Right-Wing	0.892	+0.012	+1%
Yes Vote	0.031	-0.849	-96%

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
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
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
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Trade, Wealth & “Yes” Votes



Trade, Wealth & “No” Votes



Conclusions

- Strategic voting ($p=.005$)
- Democracies are more oppositional and resistant, but comply because they are targeted
- Poor countries are more vulnerable, but resist because they are oppositional
- Implications for use of UNGA voting as a measure of preferences