


MULTILATERALISM AND REFERENDUM SUCCESS



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The Argument

- Goals:
 1. To identify and demonstrate the factors most relevant to the outcomes of referendums on a multilateral treaty, such as the European Union.
 2. To examine the changing nature of relationships members states have had with the multilateral framework via bilateral agreements.
- Main Question: Have bilateral agreement referendums been beneficial to furthering multilateral relationships between members?

Premises

1. Leaders have some control over campaign agendas for treaty ratification.
2. By signing treaties members bind themselves to the objectives of the organization.
3. Positive contributions of new members to existing frameworks have to be balanced with the costs they would bring to the organization.


Relevant Literature

1. Multilateralism is democracy enhancing (Keohane, Macedo and Moravscik, 2009).
2. Institutions of Multilateralism are not as equal in payoffs as Multilateral Organizations; some have to be persuaded not to free ride (Martin 1992).
3. Domestic Politics is key to the real politics of change and enforcement of standards within states empowering individuals (Simmons 2009).
4. Multilateralism prevails in areas where bargaining & coordination problems exist, bilateralism prevails where there is enforcement through retaliation (Verdier 2008).

Theory Basics

1. Bilateral agreements already exist.
2. Referendums have increasingly been used to allow for domestic approval of international agreements.
3. Uncertainty in electoral support (a transactions cost) can mean bilateral agreements could change the way the public perceives of the multilateral counterparts.
4. Costs of adherence to multilateral treaty goals will contribute to leader decisiveness.
5. Multilateral organizations vary their offers depending on the leader's threshold of campaign conduct.

Decisiveness Index



Game Tree

○ Players: MO and G


Actions:

➤ MO choose c


➤ G acts D or ID

➤ N assigns value to p_D and $1-p_D$.

○ Game starts with MO picking from among the treaties to make an offer.



Equilibria



Treaty Offers at the Equilibrium





Table 1. Referendums by R/UR & D/ID

Table 1: Referendum Votes, Leader Decisiveness and Restricted Treaties


	Decisive	Indecisive
Restricted	1972 - Switzerland, 1975 - Great Britain, 1986 - Denmark, 1992 - Liechtenstein, 1993 - Denmark, 1994 - Finland, 1995 - Liechtenstein, 1986 - Denmark, 1998 - Denmark, 2000 - Denmark, 2000 - Switzerland, 2002 - Ireland, 2003 - Sweden, 2009 - Ireland	1972 - Norway, 1992 - Switzerland, 2000 - Switzerland, 2001 - Ireland, 2003 - Spain
Unrestricted	1972 - France, 1972 - Denmark, 1972 - Ireland, 1987 - Ireland, 1989 - Italy, 1992 - Ireland, 1994 - Norway, 1994 - Austria, 1994 - Sweden, 1998 - Ireland, 2003 - Latvia, 2003 - Lithuania, 2003 - Estonia, 2003 - Slovenia, 2005 - Slovenia, 2005 - Switzerland, 2005 - Luxembourg, 2006 - Ireland	1992 - France, 1992 - Denmark, 2001 - Ireland, 2003 - Poland, 2003 - Czech Republic, 2003 - Slovakia, 2003 - Hungary, 2005 - France, 2005 - Netherlands, 2008 - Ireland

Restricted versus Unrestricted Offers




Referendum Turnout Rates


R, ID




R,D



UR, ID



UR,D



Multilateralism & Political Participation

- Political Participation in multilateralism will increase through bilateral treaty referendums.
- Uncertainty in electoral support (a transactions cost) can mean bilateral agreements could change the way the public perceives of multilateral counterparts.
- Decisive leaders conduct referendum campaigns that enhance issue awareness.
- Treaty restrictions can be put on offer by multilateral organizations to increase issue overlap with voters.