

Trade Competition and American Decolonization

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Motivations

Philippine independence in comparative perspective

1. The role of sugar. Why? How?
2. The “inevitability” of decolonization
3. Decolonization in a time of empire

Trade, Production, and Late Colonialism

Early colonialism \Rightarrow Extraction and market capture

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Late colonialism \Rightarrow

Imperial expansion + technological change + agr. development
= **competition between metropolises and colonies**

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Politics \Rightarrow supporters versus opponents of decolonization

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1. Diverse colonial exports
2. Easy substitution for domestic products

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
1. Diverse colonial exports
2. Easy substitution for domestic products

More opposition to decolonization if


1. Colonial producers are “represented” in the metropole
2. Colonial producers overcome collective action problems

Expectations

Support for and Opposition to Decolonization




Today's Three Cases



Comparing the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico


	Philippines	Hawaii	Puerto Rico
Sugar Exports	High	High	High
Ethnic-Racial Core	“Asiatic”	“Asiatic”	“Latin”
Dominant Religion	Catholicism	“Indigenous”	Catholicism
Time as U.S. Terr.	Since 1898	Since 1898 (...)	Since 1898
Strategic Importance	High	High	High
Independence demand	High	High	High
U.S. Share of Sugar	c. 10%	100%	68%
Industrial conc.	Dispersed	“Big Five”	Four Firms
Other exports	Coconuts	None	None

Sugar Production




Ownership

Philippines' Sugar Industry, 1930




Ownership

Puerto Rican Sugar Industry, 1930




Concentration

Puerto Rico, 1930



Concentration

Hawaii, 1939 (Big Five)



Collective Action and Political Power

Puerto Rico: Access in Washington and control in San Juan

By the depression, absentee corporations controlled the bulk of sugar production along with the most important supportive economic activities such as banking, transportation, communications, public utilities, and most important of all government.

– Bergad 1978: 81

Not only were the various U.S. appointed governors concerned with protecting U.S. interests, which meant sugar, but sugar permeated the islands political life. The political parties which received financial donations from sugar and its associated interests could survive; the rest could not. The insular legislature came to be composed quite largely of Puerto Rican sugar lawyers who were understandably loath to disturb the islands principal industry and their own sources of income

–Hanson 1955: 31

Collective Action and Political Power

Hawaii: the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association

The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association provides a convenient medium for unifying and implementing the policies of the factors. It is governed by five trustees, each representing one of the five factors they also appoint the other administrative officers. The Association is financed by the plantation members on the basis of the sugar tonnage each produces. All [sugar] is marketed under an agreement whereby all sugar producers in the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association use the same marketing organization and receive the same price per ton. Thus the integration of the Hawaiian sugar industry has been carried to its ultimate step in the refining and marketing of the product to the mainland


– Shoemaker 1940: 29, 31

Control over the basic economic institutions of Hawaiian society reaffirmed the elite's political position. Political and economic hegemony within Hawaii provided the Island oligarchy with a base from which to deal with elites in Washington, New York, and San Francisco

– Kent 1993: 78

Exports

Philippines' Exports to the United States, 1929



Voting for Philippine Independence

Narrative evidence of support for Philippine independence from

1. Sugar beets
2. Other U.S. sugar cane
3. Cotton
4. Dairy
5. Agriculture in general

NB: of course, also unions, racists, progressives too


Further empirics: mixed-effect probit regression of Senate votes for Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933 as function of partisanship, agricultural profiles, Filipino population, state-level effects

Agriculture by State

Sugar Beets (10,000s of acres harvested)



Sugar Cane (1,000s of acres harvested)









Cottonseed (100,000s of tons produced)



Milk (100,000,000s of pounds produced)



Main Results



Models and simulations via Zelig (Imai, King, Lau)

Conclusions and Implications

1. Not trade itself, but organization and structure

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 - ▶ What did Belgium and Portugal make?
3. Disciplinary and subdisciplinary divides
 - ▶ Milner 1998
 - ▶ area studies vs. ethnic studies vs. polisci

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Extras: Regression Results

	Model 1			Model 2		
	<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Z</i>
<i>Fixed Effects</i>						
(Intercept)	0.65	1.27	0.51	0.46	1.04	0.44
Democrat	2.29	0.66	3.49			
Cotton	0.21	0.14	1.49	0.33	0.09	3.52
Sugarbeets	0.34	0.14	2.36	0.22	0.11	1.94
Milk	-0.19	0.18	-1.06	-0.09	0.15	-0.64
Pct. Filipino	-0.01	0.13	-0.07	0.03	0.10	0.31
<i>Random Effects</i>						
State	0.16	0.40		0.03	0.18	
Observations		94			94	
Groups		48			48	

Each model is estimated via mixed effects probit regression (Bailey and Alimadhi 2007). Cotton, Sugarbeets, Milk, and Pct. Filipino are expressed in logs.

Extras: The E Word

Pepinsky:

Ownership → lobbying → independence

Joint Determination:


Likelihood of independence → lobbying → independence

ownership

The diagram shows a horizontal flow from 'Likelihood of independence' to 'lobbying' to 'independence'. Below 'lobbying' is the word 'ownership'. An arrow points from 'ownership' up to the arrow between 'Likelihood of independence' and 'lobbying'. Another arrow points from 'ownership' up to the arrow between 'lobbying' and 'independence'.


Extras: Origins of U.S. Sugar (1)

Sugar Production, 1921–1940



Extras: Origins of U.S. Sugar (2)

Origins of U.S. Sugar Supply, 1931–33 Average



Extras: Concentration Illustrated

