

The Moral Foundations of Individual-Level Foreign Policy Preferences

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Abstract

Individuals clearly differ in their foreign policy preferences. Some support higher defense spending and more aggressive stances toward other countries, others oppose the use of force except in the most extreme circumstances. Some prefer working through multilateral institutions, others believe it is necessary to maintain full freedom of action on all foreign policy issues. Social psychology posits that individuals hold varying moral foundations, which they group in five dimensions of care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/submission, and sanctity/degradation. Liberals tend to emphasize care/harm and fairness/cheating disproportionately, while conservatives appear to weight each foundation more equally. Drawing on this work, we first replicate the association between the moral foundations and political identity and domestic policy preferences. We then extend this research to foreign policy issues, finding significant relationships between moral foundations and attitudes on a variety of policy questions. We also conduct two survey experiments that prime respondents with different moral foundations and find no significant effect on attitudes. We postulate that moral concerns are already salient in the minds of respondents when they answer questions about foreign policy.

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Why do individuals differ in their foreign policy preferences? Even casual observation suggests that people, even within the same country, hold widely varying attitudes toward the use of force, the United Nations, globalization, and human rights. In 2003, for instance, Americans were deeply split over whether to attack Iraq and, if so, whether approval of the United Nations was necessary; even among those who supported the war, some were motivated by the threat of weapons of mass destruction while others were moved by the opportunity to remove an evil tyrant from power. In this paper, we find that foreign policy attitudes are rooted, in part, in differentially-held moral foundations that are themselves believed to be relatively stable and enduring at the individual level.

Haidt (2012) and collaborators have found that individuals hold five moral foundations in varying degrees: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/submission, and sanctity/degradation, which we explain in more detail below. Liberals in the United States tend to emphasize care/harm and fairness/cheating, while conservatives weight each of the five foundations more equally. The foundations have been found to predict political positions on domestic issues (Koleva, Graham, Iyer & Ditto 2012). In surveys of U.S. respondents, we extend these foundations to foreign policy attitudes and find similar associations.

We do not claim that these moral foundations are the sole or even a major determinant of foreign policy attitudes. Opinions held by individuals have many causes. Nonetheless, these moral foundations are strongly related to attitudes on a large range of foreign policy issues, even controlling for self-described ideology and common demographic traits. The relationships between specific moral foundations and particular foreign policy issues will also likely surprise few readers. If one accepts the foundations, their consequences for different foreign policy issues are relatively straightforward. It is hardly counter-intuitive that individuals concerned with care/harm will want to protect weaker nations from foreign aggression or that those scoring high on sanc-

tity/degradation will agree that their culture needs protection from foreign influence. What is surprising, however, is that just a few moral foundations can predict attitudes across such a large number of not only domestic policy but also foreign policy dimensions, including issues of both security and political economy.

The so-called Cold War consensus on foreign policy attitudes held that public opinion was capricious, inchoate, and even dangerous (Almond 1950, Lippmann 1955, Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1960, Converse 1964). This view intersected with and supported theories of international relations that assumed politics stopped “at the waters edge” and relatively autonomous statesmen (the gendered noun is intentional) were free to pursue what they regarded as the “national interest.” This consensus was shattered by the Vietnam War, which demonstrated beyond doubt that the public clearly held differing opinions over foreign policy, expressed their disagreements forcefully, and ultimately constrained policy (Verba et al. 1967, Mueller 1973, Holsti 1996). We now know that public opinion on foreign policy is a lot like opinion on any political topic. It is relatively coherent and, at least in the aggregate, relatively stable (Page & Shapiro 1992).¹ In most cases, it is also “pretty prudent” or sensible given the issues of the day (Jentleson 1992, Nincic 1992). Reflecting this structure, and focusing mostly on security issues, scholarly consensus posits that attitudes vary along two core dimensions: militant internationalism (MI), defined by views on the use of force, and cooperative internationalism (CI), a cluster of views supporting international institutions and world order. These two dimensions, in turn, combine to create four approaches to foreign policy: hard-liners (support MI, oppose CI), accommodationists (oppose MI, support CI), internationalists (support both), and isolationists (oppose

¹For an alternative that emphasizes the changeable nature of public opinion, see Russett & Deluca (1981).

both) (Holsti 1996).² Although the questions that comprise these dimensions have changed over time, the four types continue to describe broad approaches to foreign policy even after the Cold War. Although most of the time these foreign policy attitudes are latent, opinion can be activated by crises, especially war casualties (Mueller 1973, Milstein 1974, Gartner 1997, Gelpi, Feaver & Reifler 2006, Berinsky & Druckman 2007), and shaped by elite opinion (Zaller 1992), the media (Powlick & Katz 1998, Baum 2003, Baum & Groeling 2009), and other cues. Once activated, moreover, the public can constrain the choices of national leaders – and leaders may even shape policy in anticipation of public opinion becoming activated in various instances.³ In short, we now believe foreign policy attitudes are both meaningful and that they matter (Aldrich et al., 2006, Baum & Groeling 2008).

Although we can identify enduring types of individuals with clusters of foreign policy attitudes, we still lack strong theories or explanations of where these schools “come from” or why individuals hold specific attitudes. The types are induced from responses to a range of questions on foreign policy and, even though they support the idea of coherent belief structures, they cannot by themselves be used to explain the underlying attitudes. Instead, scholars have attempted to explain individual attitudes by age cohort, gender, and other demographic traits or by ideology or partisanship, but whether the latter are causes or effects remains unclear (Holsti 1996). The closest approach in foreign policy studies to ours is the hierarchy of attitudes model of Hurwitz & Peffley (1987), which derives foreign policy attitudes from underlying principles of ethnocentrism and the morality of warfare.⁴ Related studies examine the link between foreign policy attitudes and personality traits like aggression and accommodation (Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser 1999, Herrmann, Tetlock

²For a comparison of foreign policy dimensions in the United States and Sweden, see Bjereld & Ekengren (1999). For a defense of “realist” views of public attitudes, see Drezner (2008).

³On rally effects, see Baker & Oneal (2001) or Chapman & Reiter (2004).

⁴On elite and mass uses of core beliefs, see Goren (2001).

& Diascro 2001), distrust (in general, and between Americans and others) (Bartels 1994, Brewer & Steenbergen 2002, Binnning 2007), or preferences over other-regarding and positive inducements (Nincic & Ramos 2010).⁵ Our moral foundations are more clearly exogenous to foreign policy attitudes and more general, since the same foundations have been shown to co-vary with a range of domestic policy attitudes as well.⁶ We also show that these moral foundations are related to both attitudes toward security policy and foreign economic policy.

In international political economy, scholars have taken a substantially different tack to explaining attitudes than in the general foreign policy literature. Unlike security issues that can be reasonably treated as public goods or on which we might expect – in theory – people to have relatively homogenous views, economic policies have more clearly identifiable distributional implications. Although the most useful unit of analysis – factors, sectors, or firms – remains debated, economic theory predicts that economic openness in goods or factor markets will create both relative winners and losers, and that these actors will seek to obtain policies favorable to their interests in the political arena, more often through direct lobbying than the electoral connection posited in the larger foreign policy literature above (see Frieden and Rogowski 1996). Even as there is evidence that such predictions hold at the aggregate or group level, manifested in the ability of theories to explain actual patterns of economic openness and the surrounding political struggles, there is only modest evidence that the predictions hold at the level of individuals (Scheve & Slaughter 2001, Kaltenthaler, Gelleny & Ceccoli 2004, Rho & Tomz 2012).⁷ This may be a measurement problem, as it is extremely difficult to attach individual respondents in a survey

⁵On personality traits and political attitudes in general, see Gerber, Huber, Doherty & Dowling (2011).

⁶For an argument that both domestic and foreign policy preferences lie on a single left-right continuum, see Murray, Cowden & Russett (1999).

⁷For a defense of economic interests as determinants of individual-level attitudes, see Fordham (2008) and Fordham & Kleinberg (2012).

to particular occupations or positions within the economy, a problem that we do not solve here (see below). On the other hand, it is increasingly clear that individuals do not define their policy preferences strictly in terms of their positions as producers within the international division of labor. Rather, they appear to have more complex policy preferences derived from their roles as consumers as well as producers (Baker 2005, Naoi & Kume 2011), sociotropic goals like full employment or equality (Scheve & Slaughter 2006, Mansfield & Mutz 2009, Hainmueller, Hiscox & Margalit 2011), religiosity (Scheve & Stasavage 2006), gender (Goldstein et al. 2007), identity (Rankin 2001), or ethnocentrism (Sabet 2012). In some ways, in moving beyond economic determinants, the political economy literature is beginning to converge with the literature on foreign policy attitudes more generally. Even here, however, a large portion of the variance in individual attitudes remains unexplained.

The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of individual-level attitudes toward a range of foreign policy issues by building from a common core of moral foundations. Part I lays out moral foundation theory (MFT) and addresses several common objections. Although we cannot reject these criticisms, we argue that they do not undermine our results. Part II reports on an online survey conducted in Fall 2012, correlating the moral foundations with a battery of foreign policy questions drawn from other frequently used surveys. We do not innovate on either the moral foundation questionnaire (MFQ) or the foreign policy questions themselves, but rather use these tools precisely for their comparability with other studies. Part III presents results on two survey experiments conducted in January-March 2013. In these experiments, we prime respondents on the care/harm or loyalty/betrayal foundations and then repeat the battery of foreign policy questions. Although our respondents “took” or absorbed the primes, the priming had no systematic effect on foreign policy attitudes, including those questions that were highly related to care/harm and

loyalty/betrayal in the previous survey. This suggests that the moral foundations are relatively stable and likely present in the minds of respondents when answering questions even without manipulation. This implies that the moral foundations are deeply rooted and relatively consistent in their effects on attitudes regardless of framing.

1 The Moral Foundations

Haidt and his co-authors have identified five moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph 2004, Haidt & Graham 2007, Haidt & Joseph 2007). These foundations were originally derived inductively from a survey of cultures and human practices as the “best candidates for universal cognitive modules upon which cultures construct moral matrices” (Haidt 2012, 124).⁸ The foundations are understood to be intuitive, nearly automatic responses by individuals to situations that are robust to rationality and justification, although initial reactions based on a foundation may be overwritten by conscious thought and reasoning.⁹ When confronted with an example of incest between consenting adults, for instance, nearly everyone reacts with disgust (violation of sanctity/degradation), even though many cannot explain why; most are unpersuaded by arguments that no one was harmed in the encounter, but some may reason their way to begrudging acceptance.¹⁰ From this, Haidt (2012, 131) argues that moral foundations are “organized in advance of experience.”

The five foundations (in their positive and negative valences) are, briefly:¹¹

⁸Haidt acknowledges his debt to and the overlap of these foundations with those identified by Shweder (1991) and Fiske (see Rai and Fiske 2011).

⁹In this way, the cognitive framework is similar to Kahneman (2011) and Tetlock (2006).

¹⁰A common technique used by Haidt and his associates is to challenge initial reactions to violations of moral foundations with reasoned counter-arguments. Most subjects experience “moral dumbfounding” in which they cannot counter the counter-arguments but still believe the violation is morally wrong. Haidt (2012, 25, 38-40).

¹¹The labels for each have varied over time; we use the labels from Haidt (2012). In the book, Haidt poses a sixth foundation of liberty/oppression. Although he is possibly tapping into another dimension here, this sixth dimension overlaps considerably with both fairness/cheating and authority/submission, muddling the framework and, in our view,

- **Care/harm:** characterized by the emotion of compassion and the virtues of caring and kindness toward others.
- **Fairness/cheating:** concerns equality and proportionality in social relations, violations of which provoke anger (by victims) and guilt (by perpetrators); associated with virtues of justice and trustworthiness.
- **Loyalty/betrayal:** manifested in feeling of attachment and pride in ones “in group” and fear of any “out group,” even though groups may be arbitrary associations (such as sports teams); characterized by patriotism and self-sacrifice toward group members, and rage and anger toward those who “defect” from the group.
- **Authority/submission:** distinguished by the emotions of respect and fear towards the authority as an institution or those in authority as individuals and the virtues of obedience and deference; unlike the other foundations, which appear bounded by neutrality at one end of the continuum, some individuals may have an active aversion to authority, in general, or to some authorities, in particular.
- **Sanctity/degradation:** disgust towards certain objects or acts that are perceived as “unclean” or taboo, offset by the virtues of temperance, chastity, piety, or cleanliness.

While the particular meaning of each foundation as well as “triggers” that evoke the associated emotions vary by culture, time, and context, Haidt claims that all individuals respond at least in part to all five foundations. Haidt measures the moral foundations through responses to a battery of questions on the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), available online and reproduced in the appendix to this paper.¹² For our purposes, the important point is that none of the questions on the MFQ are “political,” though some of the authority questions are phrased in general terms about government and law, and none address specific policy issues.

Figure 1 displays the correlations among the 30 questions on the MFQ by our respondents in the primary survey (described below). The questions are labeled down the main diagonal with the letter corresponding to the foundation they measure (“H” for care/harm, “F” for fairness/cheating, “L” highlighting the first problem identified by critics of moral foundations theory (see below). The moral foundation questionnaire does not yet contain questions (and thus scores) on liberty/oppression, so we do not explore this dimension here.

¹²Available at: <http://www.yourmorals.org/explore.php?PHPSESSID=5b72daf75c8b8a583765f6da6ca15aaf> (accessed Feb. 1, 2013).

for loyalty/betrayal, “A” for authority/submission, and “S” for sanctity/degradation). Boxes shaded in blue indicate that the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between two questions is positive; red indicates a negative correlation. Darker shading indicates values further from zero. Thus, dark shading down the main diagonal suggests that questions for the same foundation are similar (convergent validity), while light shading far from the diagonal suggests that questions measuring different foundations are not similar (discriminant validity). We see this general pattern below. The figure also makes clear that the five foundations form two natural clusters (large blue sections in the upper right and bottom left). These two clusters are known as the “individualizing” (care/harm and fairness/cheating) and “binding” (loyalty/betrayal, authority/submission, and sanctity/degradation) foundations.

[Figure 1 About Here]

For Political Scientists, one of the most interesting patterns to emerge from the MFQ is that self-identified Liberals score higher on the care/harm and fairness/cheating foundations, and lower on the others, while self-described Conservatives score more evenly across all five foundations.¹³ Our convenience sample, described in the next section, replicates this core finding (compare Figure 2 to Figure 8.1 in Haidt 2012, 158). The two clusters of foundations in Figure 1 are essentially reproduced in this graph, with care/harm and fairness/cheating taking very similar values as ideology moves from left to right. From this pattern, Haidt (2012) implies that Conservatives have a more complex view of morality, itself an implied normative conclusion that we do not share.¹⁴

[Figure 2 About Here]

¹³For other approaches to morality and political ideology, see Lakoff (2002; 2009), Jost, Nosek & Gosling (2008), and Carney (2008). Weber & Federico (2013) find considerable heterogeneity within ideological camps.

¹⁴Chapter 8 is entitled “The Conservative Advantage” and Chapter 12 discusses Liberal “blind spots” in which the range of moral foundations embraced by Conservatives cannot be seen.

Also important, moral foundations are closely associated with a range of policy issues (Koleva et al. 2012). Even controlling for demographic attributes, ideology, religious attendance, and sociopolitical beliefs, moral foundations are significant predictors of attitudes toward abortion, same-sex marriage, torture, teaching creationism, gun control, flag burning, stem cell research, and other public policy concerns, including some international issues like global warming, defense spending, and terrorism. It is precisely this predictive power that we wish to extend to foreign policy preferences, not only explaining foreign policy attitudes more fully but connecting individual views on international issues to domestic issues as well.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) has been subject to a number of criticisms, most pointedly by Suhler & Churchland (2011).¹⁵ First, the five foundations are, if not arbitrary, neither exhaustive nor distinct from one another. As Suhler and Churchland (2011, 2106) write, “other basic moral values exhibited by humans across various cultures have as much – or as little – call to be included as do Haidts favored five,” with two strong contenders being industry and modesty. Conversely, the five foundations may all be variants of a more fundamental care/harm principle. As Suhler and Churchland (2011, 2107) again note, the loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation foundations “may, for all we can be sure, merely be extensions of harm concerns to entities other than individual persons...” There is much to this criticism. Theoretically, one can plausibly link each of the other foundations to the care/harm principle. Empirically, as indicated in Figure 1, there is some overlap between questions on the MFQ and related foundations, especially in the two main clusters around care/harm and fairness/cheating, on the one and, the other foundations, on the other. Yet, though there may be strong reason to doubt that the foundations are autonomous modules that can be easily separated one from the others, empirically they do appear to be at least somewhat distinct.

¹⁵For a response see Haidt & Joseph (2011).

Recognizing the force of this critique, our justification for using MFT and the MFQ rests on practicality. Of the possible ways of categorizing and measuring moral foundations, MFT is the most developed at the moment and the MFQ is both publicly available and has been used in numerous studies, including some on domestic policy preferences. Equally, though the foundations may overlap, they do correlate differently with various domestic and, as we shall see, foreign policy issues in ways that are broadly intuitive. Is MFT in its current incarnation *the* theory of moral foundations? We doubt it. But it does provide a solid basis for examining the possible determinants of foreign policy preferences.

Second, Haidt (2012, Chapter 7) claims that the foundations are innate, emerging as adaptive responses to environmental challenges faced by our primate ancestors and especially early humans living in social groups. In his view, care/harm arose from the need to protect and nurture vulnerable children, fairness/cheating evolved from the rewards for cooperation and the corresponding need to protect oneself from exploitation, loyalty/betrayal was a response to the challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions, authority/subversion follows from the even larger gains from organized and enforced cooperation in groups, and sanctity/degradation emerged from the need to protect oneself and related others from a world of pathogens and parasites. Suhler and Churchland (2011) argue, however, that there is no neurobiological or physiological basis in the brain for these traits and, thus, they are unlikely to be innate or genetic in origin. We find it plausible that humans are predisposed to moral foundations, but remain steadfastly agnostic whether morality is a product of “nature” or “nurture.” Even if the human brain evolved for social skills, a position that Churchland (2011) herself broadly accepts, whether the moral foundations we use are the product of our genes or culture remains very much an open question. At the same time, we find the extreme form of innateness implausible. Even if humans are predisposed to moral foundations in general, it is

extremely unlikely that any individual is genetically “hard-wired” to favor some foundations over others or to be born “Liberal” or “Conservative.”¹⁶

In the end, we do not need to resolve the innateness question for our purposes. All that is necessary for us here is that moral foundations are formed prior to political awareness, or the development of an interest in and knowledge of politics within one’s community. Although there is no definite dividing line, it appears that political awareness typically begins to arise only in late childhood or early adulthood.¹⁷ This seems plausible. Yet, even young children have strong moral senses about caring/harm, fairness/cheating, and so on, long before they can generalize these standards to the political community in which they live and, more so, to other political communities with which they might indirectly interact as captured in our foreign policy questions. This is not to suggest that children who are more caring or concerned with fairness at a young age will carry those concerns into adulthood. Although one’s moral foundations seem to be relatively stable, this has not been tested in panel studies and it seems likely that one’s moral stance evolves over time.¹⁸ Nonetheless, it seems reasonable that an individual’s moral foundations are “pre-political” or broadly formed prior to engaging specific questions of politics and public policy. Although it is possible, of course, that policy preferences may affect one’s moral foundations, we think the feedback is likely minimal. We proceed in the remainder of this paper to assume that moral foundations are exogenous relative to foreign policy preferences.

¹⁶But see Cranmer & Dawes (2012) who argue, on the basis of foreign policy preferences, that there is a genetic basis for ideology.

¹⁷This is a neglected topic. See Hess & Torney (2009), originally published in 1967, and Furnham & Gunter (1983).

¹⁸As suggested by Haidts (2012) own political evolution described in his book, itself an odd testament for someone who believes moral foundations are innate.

2 Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy Attitudes

2.1 Survey

To examine the role played by moral foundations in the formation of foreign policy attitudes, we conducted a survey of 1,561 American adults recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MT) platform. MT provides access to a large pool of users who complete short tasks for small payments (generally less than \$1). While MT does not provide access to a random or nationally representative sample, the available pool is considerably more diverse than other convenience samples, such as college students (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010). The non-random nature of the sample does threaten the generalizability of our results, and our sample was more female, more liberal, and less religious than the American public (see Appendix, Table A.1). Nonetheless, we have no reason to believe that the sampling procedure threatens the internal validity of our conclusions for two reasons. First, we recruited subjects to answer a survey about their “attitudes and opinions,” without any mention of either politics or morality, so selection based on those factors is unlikely. Second, we see no reason to suspect that MT users systematically differ from the general public in terms of the relationship between the moral foundations and their foreign policy attitudes, and we find that the correlations among dependent variables and demographics in our survey are similar to those found elsewhere (see Appendix, Figure A.1). This parallels the finding of Berinsky, Huber & Lenz (2012), who replicate a number of established experimental effects using samples drawn from MT.

A second concern in using MT involves data quality. Because MT users are paid upon completion of tasks, they have incentives to complete those tasks as quickly as possible, which might lead to low quality data. Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling (2011) find that the reliability of psychometric

instruments given via MT is as good as or better than the reliability of instruments administered in person. Furthermore, they show that data quality is not related to compensation levels, which is particularly reassuring. Nonetheless, we took steps to ensure the quality of our data by embedding two “catch” questions with obvious answers into our instrument and discarding questionnaires submitted by respondents who failed these questions. This led to the elimination of 219 responses (roughly 14% of our total).¹⁹

Our survey instrument contained four sets of questions: a group of demographic controls, the MFQ30 used to measure the moral foundations, a set of foreign policy questions drawn from previous surveys, and a set of questions about domestic politics used to replicate earlier work. The demographic questions were always presented first, but the order of the other questions was randomized across respondents. We discuss each of these sets of questions in turn.

For our demographic controls, we collected the same variables used by Haidt and his collaborators: age, gender, political ideology, interest in politics, education, party identification, household income, and religiosity. Because we include a number of questions about foreign economic policy, we also attempted to capture whether or not the primary wage earner in a respondent’s household works in a tradable sector of the economy.²⁰ Our measure of occupation is crude; we collect data on employment in ten broad groupings, classifying agriculture, mining, and manufacturing as tradable sectors. The problems with this measure are obvious, but more detailed measurement is impractical within the constraints of a relatively short survey. We also have no reason to believe that employment in particular industrial sectors correlates with individual attitudes about morality,

¹⁹The first of these asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: “It is better to do good than to do bad”; respondents who answered disagree were discarded. The second question is embedded in the MFQ and asks if “Whether or not someone was good at math” is relevant to their moral judgments. Respondents who answered “very relevant” or “extremely relevant” were discarded.

²⁰Because many MT users are (unsurprisingly) students, stay-at-home parents, or unemployed we believe this measure is superior to asking about the respondent’s personal employment status.

so it is unlikely that the lack of fine-grained employment data skews our results.

Our next group of questions is the standard MFQ, which consists of six questions designed to measure each of the five moral foundations, for a total of 30 questions. These questions break into two groups - the judgments subscale (which asks respondents to express agreement or disagreement with normative statements such as “Chastity is an important and valuable virtue”) and the relevance subscale (which asks respondents how important various factors are to their opinions about morality). These questions were originally generated for face validity and then refined on the basis of internal consistency and breadth of coverage. The developers of the MFQ have demonstrated that it has high internal consistency, high test-retest validity, and that five factors fit the data it generates well in confirmatory factor analysis. MFQ responses also have high predictive power for a variety of related attitudes and judgments (Graham et al., 2011). Scores for each foundation are calculated from the six relevant questions as a simple additive index and normalized to range from 0 to 5. Because there are six possible responses to each question, the resulting measure is effectively continuous.

The foreign policy questions on our instrument were drawn from three recent surveys conducted on nationally representative samples: the 2010 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, the 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Spring 2010 Pew Global Attitudes project survey. We selected questions from these surveys in order to maximize coverage of different topic areas in international relations and chose questions that featured substantial differences of opinion among American respondents. The selection of questions from existing instruments allows for greater comparability of our results to other research. Finally, our instrument included a series of questions about domestic politics to replicate an earlier set of findings about the relationship between the moral foundations and politi-

cal attitudes (Koleva et. al. 2012). The full survey included 93 questions and was designed to take between fifteen and twenty minutes to complete.

2.2 Survey Results

Results for all foreign policy questions are detailed in the appendix, and summarized in Table 3. In Tables 1 and 2, we present full results for two sample questions for purposes of illustration. Because the responses to each of our foreign policy questions come in ordered categories, we report the results from an ordered probit specification in each case. For each question, we examine three models: one with only each respondent's scores on the five moral foundations, a second controlling for that respondent's self-described political ideology, and a third controlling for the full set of variables listed above.

[Table 1 About Here]

We selected one highly “conservative” question for illustration, which asks respondents whether they believe that “maintaining superior military power worldwide” should be a “very important,” “somewhat important,” or “not important” goal of US foreign policy. Respondents split relatively evenly on this question: 26% answered “very important”, 42% answered “somewhat important”, and 32% answered “not important.” Table 1 shows that care/harm is strongly and highly significantly associated with opposition to maintaining US power; this finding changes little with the inclusion of controls. Conversely, all three of the “conservative” foundations – loyalty/betrayal, authority/submission, and sanctity/degradation – are significantly associated with support for maintaining US power. Even after ideology is included as a control, the foundations carry the same sign and remain significant (model 2), showing clearly that they capture attitudes above and beyond

ideology. The same is true even with our full battery of controls (model 3).

[Table 2 About Here]

We also selected one highly liberal question, which asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement “When dealing with international problems, the U.S. should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations even if this means that the United States will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice.” Approximately 17% of respondents strongly agreed with this statement, 38% somewhat agreed, 24% neither agreed nor disagreed, 14% somewhat disagreed, and 9% strongly disagreed. For this question, Table 2 shows that the care/harm, fairness/cheating, and sanctity/degradation foundations are all significant. Care/harm and fairness/cheating increase support for using the UN, while sanctity/degradation reduces it. Although there is some change in the point estimates (particularly for sanctity/degradation) after we add the control variables, the overall structure of the results on the foundations are again largely unchanged by the inclusion of the controls.

Table 3 summarizes the core findings from all foreign policy questions on our survey. Within the table, the questions are split into three groups, based on the available answer categories, and then ranked on the basis of the unconditional correlation between ideology and the responses. The five columns of the table display the five moral foundations. Because ordered probit coefficients are difficult to interpret directly, each cell displays the change in the predicted probability of a specified answer for a one point change (out of five) in the specified foundation. The specifications displayed in the table include measures of all of the foundations and all demographic control variables (model 3 in Tables 1 and 2). The significance levels displayed in the table (green means positive and significant; red means negative and significant) refer to the underlying ordered probit coefficients

rather than the predicted effects. The full ordered probit results and alternative specifications for each model are displayed in the Appendix (Table A.3).

[Table 3 About Here]

The correlation between the moral foundations and opinions on a wide variety of foreign policy issues is quite striking. For every question but one, responses correlate with at least one (and generally more than one) of the foundations at 95% confidence or greater. Within each category of question, listed in order of their unconditional correlation with political ideology, positive and significant results are largely found along the main diagonal, as expected, and negative and significant results are found along the secondary diagonal. The results display a theoretically meaningful pattern - the “liberal” foundations (care/harm and fairness/cheating) tend to be positively and significantly associated with the more “liberal” questions and negatively associated with the more “conservative” questions; while the “conservative” foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/submission, and sanctity/degradation) tend to be positively and significantly associated with the “conservative” questions. It is important to note that this association holds even *after* controlling for respondent ideology. This forms a striking visual display that the moral foundations explain a portion of the variance in foreign policy attitudes over and above that which can be attributed to political ideology. Many of the predicted effects are also large enough to be substantively quite important.

The general nature and direction of the foundation effects are fairly intuitive. For example, higher scores on the care/harm measure are associated with greater support for human rights, foreign aid, and humanitarian intervention, while higher scores on the sanctity/degradation measure correlate with increased support for counternarcotics policies, protectionism, and limits on immi-

gration. Some of the other findings are less straightforward, for example, higher scores on the authority/submission measure correlate with opposition to foreign aid. It is certainly possible to generate explanations linking these and each of the other specific findings to moral foundations theory, but our goal here is to capture the broader patterns rather than focusing narrowly on particular questions.

Despite the convergence of foreign policy and foreign economic policy studies noted in the Introduction, questions on globalization, trade and immigration appear to be somewhat distinct. Questions relating to foreign economic policy are, interestingly, typically less ideological than questions on the use of force, the United Nations, power, and culture, and cluster in the middle of the agree/disagree section of Table 3. Nonetheless, the moral foundations are still strongly related to foreign economic policy attitudes. For example, attitudes on growing trade and business ties with other countries, tapping into general attitudes toward globalization, are supported by respondents scoring higher on authority/submission and opposed by those scoring higher on sanctity/degradation, likely reflecting fears of “foreign” goods. Imports of foreign products as well as immigration of high skilled workers are opposed by respondents scoring high on both authority/submission and sanctity/degradation. Fears of foreign influence appear to be much greater among individuals who value authority and purity and may underlie attitudes towards globalization in general. In none of our political economy questions, however, is the variable for sector of primary employment income significant (see full models in appendix). This may be, as discussed above, because the categories we use are too aggregated to capture differences in exposure to trade. Women and younger respondents are more hostile to globalization in general and more protectionist on trade issues, while better educated and higher income respondents are more favorable to trade. This is largely consistent with the existing literature. Yet, the moral foundations appear to

highlight a rather different set of concerns about globalization rooted in authority/submission and sanctity/degradation.

The significant correlations between moral foundations and foreign policy attitudes suggests that foreign policy preferences are rooted, at least in part, in moral positions and likely to originate from the same sources as attitudes toward domestic policy issues (not shown). Nonetheless, moral foundations still only account for a small portion of the overall variance in foreign policy attitudes, as reflected in our battery of questions. When used to predict the dependent variables, the moral foundations generally produce a slim improvement over a naive (i.e., always predict the mode) model, peaking at a 33% improvement in rate of correct predictions for our question asking if respondents would support US intervention to preserve the oil supply. In one case (our question asking if respondents believe that the United States should strengthen the UN), the foundations increase predictive accuracy compared to the naive model by only about 1%, while in several others the improvement is essentially zero. The full predictive results can be seen in the Appendix (Table A.4). Although moral foundations do predict foreign policy attitudes, they remain only a partial explanation.

2.3 Discussion

To explore the moral foundations and the relationship of our work here to other studies of foreign policy attitudes, we fit a second statistical model in which we estimate an “ideal point” for each question in the moral space and then cluster the substantive questions by their position in this space. We fit a two-dimensional model, where the first dimension is formed by the individualizing foundations (i.e., care/harm and fairness/cheating) and the second dimension is created from the

binding foundations (i.e., loyalty/betrayal, authority/submission, and sanctity/degradation). These two dimensions are simply calculated as the mean of the foundations, which places the two on the same scale despite the uneven number of foundations involved. To facilitate estimation and interpretation, we dichotomize responses to each question so that the ideal point estimated is that for agreeing with the statement (or favoring the use of force/finding the foreign policy goals important). We adopt a two, rather than a five, dimensional model because the results are broadly similar but somewhat easier to visualize and interpret.

Specifically, we model respondent i 's response to question j (y_{ij}) as a function of an underlying latent continuous variable (y_{ij}^*), which depends on the distance between the respondent's ideal point and that of the question, that is:

$$y_{ij}^* = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} * (\alpha_{1j} - x_{1i})^2 + \beta_{2j} * (\alpha_{2j} - x_{2i})^2 + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$\epsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

$$y_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_{ij}^* \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } y_{ij}^* < 0 \end{cases}$$

Where β_0 is an intercept term, β_1 and β_2 are discrimination parameters on the two dimensions for each question, α_1 and α_2 are the ideal points for each question in the two dimensions, and x_1 and x_2 are the ideal points of the respondents (supplied by their MFQ responses). Identifying the model requires two assumptions. First, we impose the constraint that β_1 and β_2 must be positive so that we estimate the ideal point of agreement. Second, as in all latent variable models, the scale of the β parameters is not identified separately from that of σ , so we impose the traditional constraint $\sigma = 1$ to normalize this scale.

We estimate this model by maximum likelihood and plot the ideal point estimates (i.e., the α parameters) for each question in Figure 3. We also use k-means clustering to cluster the questions into four groups, which are shown by coloring the points in the figure. Within the figure, points are labelled only with a number, Table 4 lists the questions that correspond to these labels.

[Figure 3 About Here]

[Table 4 About Here]

As can be seen clearly in the figure, the ideal points of the questions vary much more along the binding foundations on the vertical axis (standard deviation of 11.5) than along the individualizing foundations on the horizontal (standard deviation of 6.3), which mirrors Haidt's finding that individuals exhibit more variation in their scores on the binding than the individualizing foundations.²¹ The binding foundations also do most of the work in separating clusters of questions, with the exception of the blue cluster, which falls substantially to the left of all of the others.

Taking the clusters in turn, the questions in the blue cluster fall at extremely low values on the individualizing foundations and moderate to high levels of the binding foundations. Substantively, several of the questions involve self-interested uses of military force, such as support for maintaining superior US military power and support for military intervention in a crisis to maintain the oil supply. These questions seem to map to Holsti's "hard liners", however, we also find that support for limiting immigration by low-skill workers falls into this cluster (point 25). We might characterize this cluster as essentially nationalist policies that promote US interests, even at the expense of others, although it is notable that defense of South Korea against North Korea falls into this group.

The red cluster, like the blue cluster, falls at high levels of the binding foundations, however, it

²¹This could, of course, be a quirk of the particular questions we selected for our survey; however, our questions cover a broad range of policies and we selected them in an attempt to generate variation on all five of the moral foundations, so we believe that this result is likely meaningful.

is positioned more centrally on the individualizing dimension. This cluster seems to again involve US self-interest, but features an interesting mixture of isolationist attitudes (e.g., support for protecting US culture against foreign influence and limiting imports) as well as more interventionist attitudes (support for strong American world leadership and efforts to promote democracy abroad). Like the blue cluster, the policies contained in the red cluster appear to be largely self-interested; however, these policies seem to be less aggressive, resulting in their less extreme placement on the individualizing foundations.

Below the red cluster lies the black cluster, characterized by mostly moderate values on both dimensions. This cluster seems to map to what Holsti labels as the internationalist set of values (support for both militant and cooperative internationalism). In this cluster, we find support for strengthening the UN as well as support for uses of force to help others, for example to stop a genocide or deal with a humanitarian crisis.

Finally, the green cluster lies at extremely low values of the binding foundations, and contains support for foreign aid, human rights, globalization, and the United Nations. These policies all represent what Holsti calls cooperative internationalism, and most of them share a general altruism. In strong opposition to the policies of the blue cluster, the group of policies here are those that privilege the interests of others over narrow U.S. self-interest, consequently falling far from the blue group on both dimensions.

While we find clusters that are, in many ways, quite similar to those identified by Holsti and others, a few points of difference are in order. First, we find that, in the moral space at least, isolationist values do not form a unique cluster. Instead, we find isolationist values (e.g., opposition to trade, immigration, and cultural diffusion) are located very close to unilateralist values (e.g., support for strong US leadership or military power), while both of these are far from more mul-

tilateralist or cooperative internationalist values (e.g., support for international organization and foreign aid). Second, it is important to note that the two dimensions here have a clear theoretical meaning (as opposed to atheoretical dimensions derived from other more inductive techniques, such as factor analysis). Thus, our results may provide the theoretical underpinnings for the dimensions identified by others. The moral foundations seem to explain at least some of the underlying coherence of foreign policy attitudes detected in other research.

3 Priming Experiments

The effect of political rhetoric and public media on moral foundations and foreign policy attitudes is potentially important but ambiguous. On the one hand, the frames used by politicians to promote policies they prefer and the media to attract readers and listeners often appeal to moral foundations. President George W. Bush, for instance, often described Saddam Hussein before the Iraq War of 2003 as an evil tyrant who abused his own people, including through the use of chemical weapons, and posed a threat to the United States. Such rhetoric likely appealed to the moral foundations of Americans on authority (rule of law), sanctity (abuse, in particularly heinous forms), harm (human rights), fairness (equal treatment), and loyalty (threat to United States). By framing issues in terms likely to resonate with the listener's or reader's moral foundations, politicians may activate support for policies they prefer and the media may stimulate interest in particular stories and, thus, attract viewers.

On the other hand, if the moral foundations of individuals are already active when considering foreign policy issues, priming those same moral foundations may have little to no effect. That is, if individuals already see questions pertaining to, say, foreign aid through the moral foundations

of harm and fairness, priming those foundations will have only a small or nil effect on opinion. As explained below, our survey experiments suggest that priming particular moral foundations has no systematic effect on opinion. This suggests that foreign policy issues already activate moral foundations independent of the particular frames evoked by others.

3.1 Priming Surveys

To test the effects of priming and rhetoric, we conducted two survey experiments in January and March of 2013, in which we primed respondents with the moral foundations, then posed the same foreign policy questions. In the first experiment, we primed respondents for the care/harm foundation; in the second, we primed the loyalty/betrayal foundation. We again recruited American adults on MT yielding 535 respondents for the first experiment and 583 for the second. These respondents answered a reduced set of demographic questions (ideology, education, and gender), the same foreign policy questions as respondents in the first round, and two catch questions, as well as completing the priming protocol.

In designing any priming experiment, a core decision is how “heavy-handed” to make the treatment. One could easily evoke the sanctity foundation, for instance, by displaying pictures of someone eating a plate of live bugs or the harm foundation by showing pictures of starving and maltreated children. Alternatively, one can prime the foundations in more subtle ways, as in the word puzzles we use here. In all of our experiments, as explained below, the subtle prime “took” in our respondents, even though the primes had little effect on responses to our foreign policy questions. We use a relative subtle prime because we believe it more accurately reflects the theoretical construct of political rhetoric of national leaders in a mature democracy like the

United States. Politicians who use extreme rhetoric are often dismissed as “demagogues.” National leaders tend to use more tempered language. Even President Bush, who appeared naturally drawn to moral appeals and may have used them more than other presidents, did not resort to slideshows of maimed children or Iraqi soldiers engaged in mutilation of human rights victims in his public addresses to the American people. In addition, politicians in competitive electoral systems like the United States use alternate frames to build support. If one politician evokes sanctity to appeal to one possible constituency, his opponent is likely to reframe the issue as one of harm or fairness to appeal to an alternative constituency. Average citizens then get bombarded by conflicting frames, the net effect of which is unclear. We anticipate that a more subtle prime will more realistically capture the net effect of competing political rhetorical frames. The media, however, may have greater leeway in evoking moral frames. In an era of increasing media market segmentation by political viewpoint, extreme rhetoric that appeals to those market segments, and the use of visually arresting and intentionally disturbing pictures and videos, media framers are often more heavy-handed. Our experiments and subtle primes, therefore, are likely more relevant for the effect of national political leaders who must appeal to broader constituencies than to the effect of media on foreign policy opinion.

The use of a more “subtle” prime also helps us overcome many of the threats to validity frequently found in priming studies. Several recent papers have failed to replicate prominent priming studies and attributed existing results to various forms of experimenter bias or hypothesis guessing (Doyen, Klein, Pichon & Cleeremans 2012, Skelton, Loveland & Yeagley 1996, Zemack-Rugar, Bettman & Fitzsimons 2007). Using a “strong” prime introduces a much higher risk that respondents will guess (correctly or incorrectly) the purpose of experiment and adjust their behavior accordingly, while our more subtle primes mitigate this threat. The use of an online sample also

greatly limits potential experimenter effects because we had no interaction with respondents and because our dependent variables did not require any subjective coding.

For our primes, we used the scrambled sentence protocol introduced by Srull & Wyer (1979), which has been adopted by numerous other studies in diverse contexts (Bargh, Chen & Burrows 1996, Epley & Gilovich 1999, Shariff & Norenzayan 2007). Our primes consisted of presenting respondents with 12 sets of 5 words, each of which could be unscrambled into a grammatical, four-word sentence. The respondents were then asked to unscramble the sentences. These sentences were identical between the treatment and control conditions with the exception of a single “target word, which changes in 9 of the 12 sentences. In the control condition, these target words are neutral with respect to morality (tall, encountered, punctuality, music, goal, quickly, cat, and expensive). In the treatment condition, the “target” word changes to a morality-related word taken from the Moral Foundations Dictionary,²²a set of words related to each of the moral foundations developed by Graham, et. al. (2009). We selected four virtue primes for the foundation being primed (caring, compassion, safety, and shelter for harm; loyal, unity, community, and family for loyalty) as well as four vice primes (endangered, cruelty, violently, and ruined for harm; excluded, spy, treacherously, and deserted for loyalty). The sentences were presented in pairs (a virtue sentence followed by a vice sentence) separated by buffer sentences (neutral sentences identical in the two conditions). As an example, a care/harm prime asked respondents to unscramble the words “Locate Woman Caring Was The” into the sentence “The woman was caring.” while the neutral or control prime asked respondents to unscramble the words “Locate Woman Tall Was The” into the sentence “The woman was tall.” In the loyalty/betrayal condition, respondents received the words

²²Available online at <http://www.moralfoundations.org/downloads/moral%20foundations%20dictionary.dic> (Accessed March 1, 2013)

“Locate Woman Loyal Was The” to unscramble as “The woman was loyal.”

The twelfth and final word group in the protocol could be unscrambled in two valid ways, only one of which used the target word.²³ By comparing the proportion of treated respondents to the proportion of control respondents who used the “target” word in their sentences, we are able to determine whether or not the priming succeeded in mentally activating the moral constructs we sought to evoke (Higgins & King 1981). Tables 5 displays covariate balance for the two survey experimental rounds. In both samples, the treatment and control groups balance on the control variables displayed in the first three rows. The fourth row displays the proportion of respondents who used the target word in the test priming sentence. The substantial, statistically significant difference between the treatment and control groups shows that the sentence unscrambling task successfully activated the moral constructs.

[Table 5 About Here]

3.2 Results of Priming Experiments

Overall, our experiments did not identify any significant or systematic effects of the primes on foreign policy attitudes. We present results for the same two illustrative questions as in section two. For each question, the first column contains all respondents, the second reports only liberal respondents, and the third reports only conservative respondents. Table 6 displays the results for the care/harm priming, while Table 7 displays the results for the loyalty/betrayal priming.

[Table 6 About Here]

²³This sentence could be unscrambled as “The teacher was qualified” in both treatment and control conditions. In the harm condition, respondents could also form the sentence “The teacher was sympathetic”; in the loyalty/betrayal condition, respondents could also form the sentence “The teacher was devoted.”; while in the control condition, respondents could also form the sentence “The teacher was young” (the words “sympathetic,” “devoted,” and “young” appeared in the same position in the two jumbles).

Examining Table 6 shows the muted effects of care/harm priming, with the prime (the variable “treated”, which takes on a value of one when respondents received the treatment prime and zero otherwise) taking on only marginal ($p < .1$) significance in two of the models of the UN question. Ideology takes on the same sign and roughly the same magnitude for both questions as it did in the original survey (Tables 1 and 2), which suggests that our samples are comparable. Priming for the care/harm foundation, however, appears to have made respondents, if anything, less supportive of the UN and more supportive of US military power. This is the opposite of the expectation generated by our first wave, in which higher care/harm scores were correlated with more support for the UN and less support for US military power. Breaking apart the sample into liberals and conservatives shows some potential heterogeneity (particularly on the UN question), but we still see no meaningful treatment effects.

[Table 7 About Here]

As in Table 6, Table 7 replicates our original finding on ideology for both questions. Loyalty/betrayal was not significant for the UN question in the original survey, so perhaps unsurprisingly, we find no effect for priming it. Loyalty/betrayal was, however, highly significant for the US military power question, so we would expect a result here. In particular, higher loyalty/betrayal scores increased the likelihood that respondents would consider maintaining US military power very important, so we might expect our priming to make respondents more likely to view maintaining US power as important. Within the sample as a whole, we find marginally significant ($p < .1$) effects for the loyalty/betrayal priming, and when limiting our sample to conservatives, the coefficient on assignment to treatment becomes significant at the conventional (i.e., 95%) level. Both findings, however, go in the “wrong” direction – the initial survey found that loyalty/betrayal

was positively associated with support for US military power, but priming the loyalty/betrayal foundation made our respondents less supportive of US power. As discussed below, we attach little meaning to this finding, as it was one of the few significant coefficients out of a large number tested.

Table 8 presents the results of the care/harm priming for all foreign policy questions, while Table 9 presents the results for the loyalty/betrayal priming. In both tables, the results displayed represent the change in the predicted probability of a given answer category for treated respondents (as compared to control respondents) after controlling for ideology, gender, and education. As in Table 6, the first column presents results for the full sample, the second column presents results only for liberal respondents, and the third column presents results for only conservative respondents. The final column presents a “treatment on the treated” estimate by coding only respondents in the treatment condition who included the target word in the test priming sentence as treated.

[Table 8 About Here]

Table 8 reveals that the care/harm priming experiment did not generate strong effects. Assignment to treatment has a statistically significant effect at 95% confidence in only four models (out of 104 estimated), which is almost exactly the expected rate of false positives (although three of the four occur in the same question); consequently, we do not attribute any meaning to the particular coefficients found to be significant. In addition to the lack of statistical significance, no clear substantive patterns emerge in the data. If the priming were effective, we would expect to see the sign on our treatment variable match the sign on the care/harm foundation from the original survey (Table 3); that is, if higher care/harm scores are associated with increased support for a given US policy goal, we would expect to see the care/harm priming also increase support for that goal. We

find, however, that the sign on the treatment dummy matches the sign from the original survey only 14 out of 26 times. If we limit attention to questions where care/harm was found to be significant in the initial survey, the sign matches only 6 out of 16 times. In short, we find nothing meaningful.

[Table 9 About Here]

As with the care/harm priming, we find essentially null results on the loyalty/betrayal priming displayed in Table 9. Once again, the coefficient on our dummy for treatment is significant in four out of 104 models, which suggests that the associations we find are likely the product of chance. Similarly, the sign for treatment matches the sign on the loyalty/betrayal foundation from Table 3 only 16 out of 26 times. If we restrict attention to cases where the coefficients were significant in the first round, the sign matches 5 out of 11 times. In short, there is again no link between the first round and the priming results.

There are several ways to interpret the null results from the priming experiments. First, it is possible that the prime was too weak to cause significant changes in answers to the foreign policy questions. While we cannot conclusively reject this possibility, the test described above does show that the priming successfully activated the relevant concepts.²⁴ Second, it is possible that the results in the initial survey were mostly due to omitted variables correlated with both the moral foundations and the various dependent variables, while the priming experiments revealed the true null effects of the foundations on foreign policy attitudes. We have no way to disprove this possibility; however, we have controlled for the most likely omitted variables in our survey,

²⁴Similarly, it is possible that our sample size was insufficient to pick up priming effects. To address this possibility, we show a model in the appendix where respondents from the first wave and the control group from the loyalty/betrayal priming wave are pooled with the control group for the harm priming experiment, providing a sample size of approximately 2,000 and a substantial increase in statistical power. The results are highly similar. This test is imperfect insofar as the assumption of random assignment is now violated; however, there is no clear reason to suspect systematic differences between these groups of respondents.

and we are not aware of other omitted variables likely to have sufficiently strong and consistent correlations with both the moral foundations and such a diverse group of dependent variables as to explain our findings.

The third and most likely explanation for our null results is that moral concerns are already salient in the minds of respondents when they answer questions about foreign policy. If individuals already view foreign policy issues through a moral lens, then priming would have little or no effect. This interpretation suggests that political rhetoric invoking moral concerns is unlikely to shift substantially opinions on foreign policy issues. Further work would be necessary to provide conclusive support for this possibility, but we view it as the most reasonable explanation. Our null results, of course, do not rule out that a more heavy-handed prime might not have a significant effect. But the weight of evidence here clearly suggests that moral foundations are already active when considering foreign policy issues and that subtle frames have little marginal effect on opinion.

4 Conclusion

The results of our primary survey show that moral foundations are statistically significant and often substantively meaningful predictors of a diverse body of foreign policy attitudes. Although the results linking particular moral foundations to specific policy issues are largely intuitive, the findings as a whole clearly indicate that foreign policy attitudes are associated with moral worldviews above and beyond that captured in political ideology. Rather than any single correlation, this link between moral foundations and foreign policy attitudes overall is the important conclusion of this study. This extends the findings of Koleva et al. (2012) that the moral foundations significantly predict variation in opinion for a diverse group of domestic policy issues, while challenging the

claims of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) that domestic and foreign policy are best explained separately. Rather, moral foundations appear to underlay a range of public policy preferences.

Our findings also demonstrate considerable similarity between the domains of security policy and foreign economic policy. The same moral foundations prove to be statistically significant predictors of both sets of attitudes. The same foundations are also significant predictors of both relatively generic attitudes (e.g., whether the U.S. should protect weaker nations against aggression) and more specific policy questions (e.g., whether the U.S. should use force in response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan). Furthermore, the effect of the foundations demonstrates a certain nuance; we see, for example, that the care/harm foundation is positively correlated with support for certain uses of force and negatively correlated with others, which suggests it cannot be reduced to a simple militarism dimension.

Although the moral foundations prove to be a novel and significant predictor of foreign policy attitudes, they are by no means the only determinant of these attitudes. We generally find that our demographic control variables also have significant predictive power, and the overall proportion of variation in foreign policy attitudes explained by the foundations is often small. Moral foundations are not the sole and likely not even the most important determinant of foreign policy attitudes, but they are important sources of opinion on foreign policy issues. This implies not only, as in past studies, that foreign policy attitudes are well structured, but that these attitudes are rooted in general moral worldviews that analysts would do well to take seriously.

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Figure 1: Correlation Among the MFQ Questions




Figure 2: Ideology and Average Foundation Scores

Ideology and the Moral Foundations




Figure 3: Results of Two Dimensional Estimation and Clustering

Question Ideal Points in Two Dimensional Space




Table 1: Ordered Probit Results for Respondent Opinion About Whether or Not Maintaining Superior Military Power Should Be An Important Goal of US Foreign Policy

	Power (1)	Power (2)	Power (3)
Harm	0.32*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.06)
Fairness	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Loyalty	-0.30*** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.06)
Authority	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.26*** (0.06)
Sanctity	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)
Ideology		-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Female Dummy			-0.05 (0.07)
Education			0.05 (0.03)
Income			-0.08* (0.03)
Age			-0.01*** (0.00)
Party ID			-0.10* (0.05)
Tradable Dummy			0.07 (0.13)
Religiosity			-0.01 (0.03)
Political Interest			-0.17** (0.06)
	Cut Points		
Very/Somewhat Important	-1.35*** (0.20)	-1.77*** (0.23)	-2.70*** (0.31)
Somewhat/Not Important	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.41 (0.22)	-1.25*** (0.30)
AIC	2405.46	2329.58	2093.17
BIC	2441.54	2370.62	2173.88
Log Likelihood	-1195.73	-1156.79	-1030.59
Deviance	2391.46	2313.58	2061.17
Num. obs.	1280	1249	1146

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.1$

Table 2: Ordered Probit Results for Question About Whether or Not the US Should Make More Decisions within the UN

	Use UN (1)	Use UN (2)	Use UN (3)
Harm	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)
Fairness	-0.38*** (0.05)	-0.27*** (0.06)	-0.29*** (0.06)
Loyalty	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Authority	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Sanctity	0.24*** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.13** (0.04)
Ideology		0.23*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.03)
Female Dummy			0.03 (0.07)
Education			-0.05 (0.03)
Income			0.02 (0.03)
Age			0.01*** (0.00)
Party ID			0.04 (0.04)
Tradable Dummy			-0.21 (0.12)
Religiosity			-0.02 (0.02)
Political Interest			0.10 (0.05)
	Cut Points		
Strongly/Somewhat Agree	-2.40*** (0.19)	-1.51*** (0.21)	-1.18*** (0.28)
Somewhat Agree/Neutral	-1.22*** (0.18)	-0.28 (0.21)	0.08 (0.28)
Neutral/Somewhat Disagree	-0.53** (0.18)	0.44* (0.21)	0.80** (0.28)
Somewhat/Strongly Disagree	0.05 (0.18)	1.07*** (0.21)	1.44*** (0.28)
AIC	3554.39	3377.32	3084.73
BIC	3600.66	3428.51	3175.31
Log Likelihood	-1768.20	-1678.66	-1524.36
Deviance	3536.39	3357.32	3048.73
Num. obs.	1263	1235	1133

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $p < 0.1$

Table 3: Survey Results for All Questions

Dependent Variable	Correlation with Ideology	Harm	Fairness	Loyalty	Authority	Sanctity
Goals of US Foreign Policy: Change in Probability of “Very Important”						
Strengthening the UN	0.254	2.2%	9.0%	3.1%	4.2%	0.7%
Protecting Human Rights	0.249	10.6%	6.2%	1.8%	-5.7%	1.6%
Protecting Weaker Nations Against Foreign Aggression	0.099	4.8%	2.0%	2.5%	-1.3%	2.5%
Promoting Democracy	-0.049	-0.2%	1.8%	5.0%	-0.5%	1.4%
Stopping the Flow of Illegal Drugs into US	-0.262	-1.2%	2.3%	4.7%	7.2%	11.5%
Maintaining Superior US Military Power	-0.370	-10.4%	-1.1%	8.2%	6.9%	2.8%
Agree/Disagree Questions: Change in Probability of “Strongly Agree”						
US Should Make More Decisions within the UN	0.410	2.5%	4.7%	-0.9%	1.9%	-2.8%
Developed Countries Have Moral Obligation to Reduce Hunger	0.266	7.3%	5.6%	-0.7%	-2.9%	0.9%
US should provide food & medicine to needy countries	0.257	5.9%	3.3%	-1.1%	-2.6%	1.4%
Econ power more important than military power	0.234	3.9%	3.3%	-0.7%	-1.9%	-2.0%
US should provide development aid	0.232	4.3%	3.1%	-0.1%	-2.3%	0.8%
Growing trades and business ties with other countries are good	0.104	2.2%	3.8%	0.8%	5.0%	-4.7%
US should provide aid to increase its influence	-0.081	-0.3%	0.4%	2.2%	1.0%	0.4%
US should limit import of foreign products	-0.089	-0.7%	0.6%	-0.7%	2.4%	3.0%
US should exert strong leadership in world	-0.132	0.6%	-0.3%	5.0%	3.6%	2.1%
US should limit immigration by high-skill workers	-0.223	-1.6%	-0.2%	0.8%	1.5%	1.7%
US should limit immigration by low-skill workers	-0.271	-2.0%	-0.4%	0.8%	3.0%	1.4%
War sometimes necessary to maintain order in world	-0.275	-8.1%	0.9%	3.7%	4.7%	1.1%
War sometimes necessary to obtain justice	-0.277	-9.8%	2.7%	3.0%	4.7%	0.2%

Our culture needs protection against foreign influence	-0.385	-1.8%	-2.1%	1.6%	1.8%	2.6%
Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (Probability of “Strongly Favor”)						
To Deal with Humanitarian Crises	0.193	6.4%	3.2%	2.2%	1.0%	0.5%
To stop a genocide	0.116	6.5%	6.5%	1.2%	-0.1%	0.8%
In response to North Korean invasion of SK	-0.043	0.3%	-1.5%	1.5%	0.8%	-0.3%
In response to Chinese invasion of Taiwan	-0.101	-1.2%	-0.1%	2.5%	-1.2%	0.3%
To Prevent Islamist Takeover of Pakistan	-0.110	-0.6%	0.2%	2.3%	1.0%	1.0%
To Ensure the Oil Supply	-0.320	-2.5%	-1.9%	3.9%	2.8%	1.5%

The numbers in the table represent the change in the predicted probability of giving the designated response for a one unit change in each foundation (from 2 to 3) with all other variables held constant at their means. Bolded, colored text indicates that the underlying ordered probit coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. Green text indicates a positive effect, while red text indicates a negative effect.

All results come from an ordered probit specification with controls for: ideology, gender, age, party ID, political interest, education, income, religiosity, and employment in a tradable sector.

Correlation with ideology is Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for the uncontrolled, bivariate relationship between each dependent variable and respondent ideology.

Table 4: Questions for Figure Locations

1	Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	14	Promoting Democracy (U.S. Goal)
2	Use U.S. troops to deal with humanitarian crises	15	Growing trade and business ties are good for our country
3	Use U.S. troops to stop a genocide	16	Protecting Human Rights (U.S. Goal)
4	Strengthening the UN	17	Econ power more important than military power
5	War sometimes necessary to maintain order in world	18	US should make more decisions within the UN
6	Our culture needs protection against foreign influence	19	US should provide development aid
7	U.S. should limit high-skill immigration	20	US should provide food and medicine to needy countries
8	Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S.	21	Developed countries have moral obligation to reduce hunger
9	Use troops in response to Chinese invasion of Taiwan	22	Use troops in response to North Korean invasion of SK
10	Use troops to prevent Islamist takeover of Pakistan	23	War sometimes necessary to obtain justice
11	U.S. should exert strong leadership in world	24	Use U.S. troops to maintain oil supply
12	U.S. should provide aid to increase its influence	25	U.S. should limit immigration by low-skill workers
13	U.S. should limit imports	26	Maintaining superior military power (U.S. goal)

Table 5: Balance and Treatment Effects for Priming Experiments

Covariate	Treatment	Control	Difference	P-value
Care/Harm Priming				
Proportion Male	0.481	0.486	-0.004	1.000
Mean Education (6 Point Scale)	3.782	3.749	0.033	0.758
Mean Ideology (7 Point Scale)	3.385	3.176	0.209	0.175
Used Target	0.634	0.374	0.259	0.000
Number of Respondents	243	243		
Loyalty/Betrayal Priming				
Proportion Male	0.574	0.534	0.040	0.406
Mean Education (6 Point Scale)	3.498	3.619	-0.121	0.208
Mean Ideology (7 Point Scale)	3.181	3.341	-0.159	0.279
Used Target	0.586	0.433	0.153	0.000
Number of Respondents	251	268		

Table 6: Care/Harm Priming Results for UN and US Power Questions

	Use UN (All)	Use UN (Lib)	Use UN (Cons)	Power (All)	Power (Lib)	Power (Cons)
Treated	0.17 (0.10)	0.01 (0.13)	0.37 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.32 (0.23)
Gender	0.17 (0.10)	0.17 (0.14)	0.10 (0.21)	0.10 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.23 (0.23)
Ideology	0.09** (0.03)	0.09 (0.09)	-0.22 (0.15)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.42*** (0.10)	-0.28 (0.16)
Education	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.06 (0.05)	0.14* (0.07)	-0.09 (0.09)
	Cut Points					
Strongly/Somewhat Agree	-0.53* (0.22)	-0.64 (0.33)	-1.97* (0.87)			
Somewhat Agree/Neutral	0.60** (0.21)	0.61 (0.33)	-1.02 (0.86)			
Neutral/Somewhat Disagree	1.64*** (0.22)	1.68*** (0.34)	-0.17 (0.86)			
Somewhat/Strongly Disagree	2.24*** (0.24)	2.40*** (0.38)	0.57 (0.87)			
Very/Somewhat Important				-1.22*** (0.23)	-1.32*** (0.35)	-2.10* (0.92)
Somewhat/Not Important				0.01 (0.23)	-0.05 (0.35)	-0.78 (0.91)
AIC	1229.45	679.56	313.17	945.40	541.03	211.29
BIC	1262.53	708.32	334.32	970.22	562.53	227.27
Log Likelihood	-606.72	-331.78	-148.58	-466.70	-264.52	-99.65
Deviance	1213.45	663.56	297.17	933.40	529.03	199.29
Num. obs.	462	269	104	463	266	106

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, · $p < 0.1$

Table 7: Loyalty/Betrayal Priming Results for UN and US Power Questions

	Use UN (All)	Use UN (Lib)	Use UN (Cons)	Power (All)	Power (Lib)	Power (Cons)
Treated	0.03 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.19 (0.20)	0.17 ⁺ (0.10)	0.10 (0.13)	0.49* (0.22)
Gender	0.21* (0.10)	0.24 ⁺ (0.13)	0.07 (0.20)	0.00 (0.10)	0.00 (0.13)	0.13 (0.22)
Ideology	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11 (0.08)	0.12 (0.13)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.35* (0.14)
Education	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.24** (0.08)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.21* (0.09)
	Cut Points					
Strongly/Somewhat Agree	-0.60** (0.21)	-0.49 (0.31)	-0.85 (0.82)			
Somewhat Agree/Neutral	0.44* (0.21)	0.66* (0.31)	-0.02 (0.81)			
Neutral/Somewhat Disagree	1.34*** (0.21)	1.65*** (0.32)	0.81 (0.82)			
Somewhat/Strongly Disagree	2.08*** (0.23)	2.31*** (0.34)	1.71* (0.83)			
Very/Somewhat Important				-1.10*** (0.22)	-1.33*** (0.33)	-1.14 (0.88)
Somewhat/Not Important				0.05 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.32)	-0.09 (0.88)
AIC	1374.23	786.16	351.30	1056.24	640.63	241.90
BIC	1407.97	815.87	373.33	1081.56	662.96	258.42
Log Likelihood	-679.12	-385.08	-167.65	-522.12	-314.32	-114.95
Deviance	1358.23	770.16	335.30	1044.24	628.63	229.90
Num. obs.	501	303	116	502	305	116

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Table 8: Care/Harm Priming Results

Dependent Variable	Full Sample	Liberals	Conservatives	ATT
Goals of US Foreign Policy: Change in Probability of “Very Important”				
Strengthening the UN	2.3%	-0.9%	-3.5%	0.8%
Protecting Human Rights	10.1%	12.7%	4.6%	10.6%
Protecting Weaker Nations Against Foreign Aggression	2.5%	4.6%	-3.8%	3.0%
Promoting Democracy	0.2%	-6.2% ⁺	1.3%	1.9%
Stopping the Flow of Illegal Drugs into US	-4.6%	-8.8% ⁺	-11.1%	-0.2%
Maintaining Superior US Military Power	3.6%	2.8%	9.2% ⁺	0.2%
Agree/Disagree Questions: Change in Probability of “Strongly Agree”				
US Should Make More Decisions within the UN	-4.9% ⁺⁺	-0.2%	-5.9% ⁺⁺	-0.1%
Developed Countries Have Moral Obligation to Reduce Hunger	3.4%	0.7%	3.1%	2.5%
US should provide food & medicine to needy countries	0.6%	1.5%	0.7%	1.9%
Econ power more important than military power	-2.2%	-2.3%	-12.1% ⁺	-2.6%
US should provide development aid	-0.8%	-1.1%	-0.0%	-2.9% ⁺
Growing trades and business ties with other countries are good	1.6%	6.7% ⁺	-9.1% ⁺	2.1%
US should provide aid to increase its influence	-0.2%	-1.0%	-2.1%	-1.1%
US should limit import of foreign products	-1.5%	-2.0%	-0.1%	-0.8%
US should exert strong leadership in world	-1.6%	-2.7%	-1.0%	-4.0% ⁺
US should limit immigration by high-skill workers	0.5%	-3.4% ⁺	4.8%	0.6%
US should limit immigration by low-skill workers	-1.5%	-2.6%	-0.8%	-1.6%

War sometimes necessary to maintain order in world	0.8%	0.7%	-2.5%	-0.2%
War sometimes necessary to obtain justice	-0.1%	-0.8%	-0.4%	-0.9%
Our culture needs protection against foreign influence	-0.4%	-1.7%	0.5%	-0.5%
Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (Probability of “Strongly Favor”)				
To Deal with Humanitarian Crises	-1.6%	-4.1%	1.3%	-2.2%
To stop a genocide	-1.1%	-4.3%	-4.5%	-0.8%
In response to North Korean invasion of SK	2.4%	-4.1%	5.0%	-3.4% ⁺
In response to Chinese invasion of Taiwan	0.2%	-0.7%	-1.1%	-2.3% ⁺
To Prevent Islamist Takeover of Pakistan	-0.0%	-1.0%	-0.5%	-2.0%
To Ensure the Oil Supply	1.9%	0.8%	3.9%	1.8%

The numbers in the table represent the change in the predicted probability of giving the designated response for members of the treatment group. Bolded, colored text indicates that the underlying ordered probit coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. Green text indicates a positive effect, while red text indicates a negative effect. The symbol ⁺⁺ designates significance at $p < .10$ and the symbol ⁺ designates significance at $p < .20$

The ATT column codes only respondents who used the target word in the treatment condition as treated. All results come from an ordered probit specification with controls for: ideology, gender, and education.

Table 9: Loyalty/Betrayal Priming Results

Dependent Variable	Full Sample	Liberals	Conservatives	ATT
Goals of US Foreign Policy: Change in Probability of “Very Important”				
Strengthening the UN	0.0%	2.8%	-13.7% ⁺	-5.7% ⁺
Protecting Human Rights	4.7%	6.5% ⁺	-4.0%	2.2%
Protecting Weaker Nations Against Foreign Aggression	3.9% ⁺	5.4%	-2.5%	1.6%
Promoting Democracy	2.9%	3.4%	-1.5%	-0.8%
Stopping the Flow of Illegal Drugs into US	2.2%	5.1%	0.9%	4.3%
Maintaining Superior US Military Power	-5.2% ⁺⁺	-2.8%	-11.3%	-5.6% ⁺
Agree/Disagree Questions: Change in Probability of “Strongly Agree”				
US Should Make More Decisions within the UN	-1.0%	0.3%	-6.4%	-1.1%
Developed Countries Have Moral Obligation to Reduce Hunger	-3.6%	-4.5% ⁺	-9.6%	-5.9% ⁺⁺
US should provide food & medicine to needy countries	-1.3%	-3.1%	1.5%	-4.0% ⁺
Econ power more important than military power	-0.1%	1.4%	-15.3% ⁺⁺	-1.3%
US should provide development aid	-0.1%	-1.9%	1.8%	-5.7%
Growing trades and business ties with other countries are good	0.3%	-2.6%	-2.3%	-6.9% ⁺⁺
US should provide aid to increase its influence	0.4%	-0.1%	1.5%	-2.5% ⁺
US should limit import of foreign products	-1.7%	-0.7%	-8.0% ⁺⁺	1.1%
US should exert strong leadership in world	-4.5% ⁺⁺	-4.8% ⁺⁺	-3.8%	-4.7% ⁺⁺
US should limit immigration by high-skill workers	-0.6%	-1.5%	1.2%	1.6%
US should limit immigration by low-skill workers	-1.5%	0.4%	-6.6%	0.5%

War sometimes necessary to maintain order in world	-3.8% ⁺	-5.5%	1.7%	-2.7%
War sometimes necessary to obtain justice	-4.0% ⁺⁺	-3.5% ⁺	-5.6%	-2.7%
Our culture needs protection against foreign influence	-2.5% ⁺	-3.4% ⁺	-2.6%	-2.4% ⁺
Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (Probability of “Strongly Favor”)				
To Deal with Humanitarian Crises	1.3%	0.9%	3.1%	1.2%
To stop a genocide	-1.6%	-3.5%	-5.9%	-1.3%
In response to North Korean invasion of SK	-0.2%	-0.6%	-0.8%	-0.7%
In response to Chinese invasion of Taiwan	1.2%	3.2% ⁺⁺	-0.5%	2.3% ⁺
To Prevent Islamist Takeover of Pakistan	0.1%	1.0%	-1.2%	0.3%
To Ensure the Oil Supply	-0.0%	-1.0%	-0.8%	-1.1%

The numbers in the table represent the change in the predicted probability of giving the designated response for members of the treatment group. Bolded, colored text indicates that the underlying ordered probit coefficient is statistically significant at $p < .05$. Green text indicates a positive effect, while red text indicates a negative effect. The symbol ⁺⁺ designates significance at $p < .10$ and the symbol ⁺ designates significance at $p < .20$

The ATT column codes only respondents who used the target word in the treatment condition as treated. All results come from an ordered probit specification with controls for: ideology, gender, and education.