The Politics of Strategic Budgeteering

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Motivation

All else equal, politicians prefer winning elections to losing them. All else equal, voters prefer not to be fooled.

Incumbents aim to increase the voters’ welfare before elections (i.e., by providing more public goods, or giving pre-electoral gifts).

Monetary business cycles unlikely because CBI & fixed exchange rates (Clark and Hallerberg 2000).

Can governments use fiscal policies to achieve this goal?

i) deficit spending (Rogoff 1990; Shi & Svensson 2002; Drazen 2000)
ii) tax revenues (Persson & Tabellini 2003)
iii) compositional spending (Drazen & Eslava 2005; Schneider 2010; Katsimi & Sarantides 2012)
Conservative Voters and Deficit Spending

Empirical evidence is weak at best:

Ability to create political budget cycles depends on availability of information.

i) fiscal transparency (Alt & Lassen 2006)
ii) state-enforced media (Ferejohn 1999)
iii) new and weak democracies (Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi and Svensson 2006)
iv) European Monetary Union
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Main Question: Has fiscal transparency eliminated the ability of governments in developed democratic countries to pursue opportunistic fiscal policies before elections?

Our Contribution: Integrated theory of how governments choose between alternative fiscal policy instruments, given the (domestic/international) institutional constraints they face.

⇒ Politics of strategic budgeteering
Assumptions

Voters want to maximize their expected income and value increased consumption.

But they are fiscal conservatives (Peltzman 1992, and many others).

Fiscal transparency allows voters to observe public deficits.

Incumbents want to signal economic competence.

Incompetent incumbents will try to appear competent through hidden action.

(Incumbents do not have monetary policy autonomy.)

Different policies:
  - Deficit spending
  - Compositional spending (current consumption vs long-term investment spending)
  - (Tax revenues)
The Argument

Deficit spending is more flexible than compositional spending, but not feasible in fiscally transparent economies.

Compositional spending is less flexible, but more feasible in transparent economies.

⇒ Trade off between flexibility and feasibility.

*H1: The lower fiscal transparency, the greater the likelihood that governments use deficit spending to increase public goods provision in preelection periods, ceteris paribus.*

*H2: The greater fiscal transparency, the more likely governments use compositional spending to increase public goods provision in preelection periods, ceteris paribus.*

Other implications:
- Closeness of elections
- Interest rates
- EMU membership
Empirical Analysis

• 32 OECD countries (1970-2012)
• Main DV: Ratio of government consumption to investment spending (OECD)
• Main IVs:
  o Preelectoral Period
  o Government debt (OECD)
  o Fiscal transparency (OBI and Alt/Lassen index)
• Other explanatory variables:
  o Closeness of election
  o Interest rates
  o EMU membership
• Controls: Unemployment, pc GDP, government control, fractionalization, checks and balances, polarization, FDI, GDP pc growth, gross savings, trade, inflation, age dependency ratio, tax revenue, etc
• Main model specification: Fixed effects TSCS regressions
Robustness Checks

Alternative dependent variables (consumption vs. investment vs deficit/debt; individual items)

Alternative fiscal strategies (interest rates, inflation, taxation)

Alternative model specifications (endogenous elections, random effects, etc)

Post-election effects

Alternative Samples: Established vs weak democracies

Partisan cycles
Main Empirical Results (I)

Preelectoral Effect on Changes in Debt
Main Empirical Results (II)

Preelectoral Effect on Government Consumption
Main Empirical Results (III)

Preelectoral Effect of Deficit Spending on Government/Investment Ratio
Main Empirical Results (III)

Preelectoral Effect of Deficit Spending on Consumption
Other Findings

Closeness of elections strengthen political budget cycles

No preelectoral effects for revenues or monetary policies

Small postelectoral effect for tax revenues (increase)

No effect of EMU membership on consumption-investment ratio (but overall better fiscal performance)

No effect of endogenous

Partisanship matters
Conclusions

Political budget cycles persist in developed economies, but in different forms

Governments always have an incentive to provide pre-electoral gifts

To increase voters’ welfare before elections and thus boost the probability of staying in office they choose between alternative fiscal strategies

⇒ Deficit Spending is most attractive but less likely if fiscal transparency is high
⇒ Governments redirect resources from long-term investment to short-term public good provision especially if elections are highly contested
Additional Graphs

Preelectoral Effect on Consumption/Investment Ratio
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Longterm/ shortterm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>General Public Services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Longterm</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Public Order &amp; Safety</td>
<td>Longterm</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Longterm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Longterm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Social Security &amp; Welfare</td>
<td>Shortterm / non-targeted</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Housing &amp; Community Amenities</td>
<td>Shortterm</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Recreational, Cultural &amp; Religious Affairs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fuel &amp; Energy</td>
<td>Shortterm / Targeted</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing &amp; Hunting</td>
<td>Shortterm / Targeted</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mining, Manufacturing &amp; Construction</td>
<td>Shortterm / Targeted</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Transportation &amp; Communication</td>
<td>Shortterm / Targeted</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Other Economic Affairs &amp; Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Other Expenditures</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>of which: Interest Payments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Adjustment to Total Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Economic Affairs &amp; Social Services (9-13) (only if 9-13 not available)</td>
<td>Shortterm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>Longterm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Electricity, Steam, Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>Shortterm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Inland &amp; Coastal Waterways</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Other Transport &amp; Communication</td>
<td>Shortterm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Other Economic Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficit vs. Fiscal Transparency

Mean of Transparency

-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Mean of Transparency

pre-election effect on relative long-term spending

Investment
Mean of Transparency

pre-election effect on relative short-term spending

Fiscal Transparency

Consumption