

Interests, Norms, and Mass Support for Global Climate Cooperation

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Question

- What explains international climate cooperation?

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Domestic political conflict

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*: Anticipated costs of climate policy implementation

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*: Anticipated costs of climate policy implementation
- *Norms*

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*: Anticipated costs of climate policy implementation
- *Norms*: Altruism and reciprocity

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*: Anticipated costs of climate policy implementation
- *Norms*: Altruism and reciprocity
- *Economic interests X Norms*

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*: Anticipated costs of climate policy implementation
- *Norms*: Altruism and reciprocity
- *Economic interests X Norms*: Conditions under which costs influence norms and vice versa.

Theoretical Argument

Domestic explanations of support for international climate cooperation:

- *Economic interests*: Anticipated costs of climate policy implementation
- *Norms*: Altruism and reciprocity
- *Economic interests X Norms*: Conditions under which costs influence norms and vice versa.

Findings: Interests and norms shape support for climate policy, and the two factors interact with each other.

Research Design

YouGov original survey conducted in 2012

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Analyses of:

- ① Correlational data: Survey and objective measures of environmental impact of individuals' sectors of employment
- ② Experimental data: Experimental conjoint analysis

Research Design

Outcomes Variables (Correlational Analysis):

- Support for Climate Change Cooperation (yes/no)
- Importance of CO₂ Emission Reductions (0–10)
- Willingness to Pay for the Environment (0–100)

Research Design

Outcomes Variables (Correlational Analysis):

- Support for Climate Change Cooperation (yes/no)
- Importance of CO2 Emission Reductions (0–10)
- Willingness to Pay for the Environment (0–100)

Outcome Variable (Experimental Analysis):

- Support for Climate Change Agreement (yes/no) based on attributes

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Values</i>
<i>Costs</i>	
Costs to Average Household	€28, €39, £15, \$53 per month
	€56, €77, £30, \$107 per month
	€84, €116, £45, \$160 per month
	€113, €154, £60, \$213 per month
	€141, €193, £75, \$267 per month
Sanctions to Average Household	No sanction
	€6, €8, £3, \$11 per month
	€17, €23, £9, \$32 per month
	€23, €31, £12, \$43 per month
<i>Participation</i>	
Number of Participating Countries	20 out of 192
	80 out of 192
	160 out of 192
Emissions Represented	40% of current emissions
	60% of current emissions
	80% of current emissions

Measurement: Interests


Measure of *Economic Interests*: High and low GHG emissions by respondents' sector of employment (results robust to alternative exposure variables such as energy intensity)

IPCC (OECD) category	Transformation notes	ISIC category
Energy (1.A1)		ISIC 4
Manufacture & Construction (1.A2)	Manufacture & Construction GHG minus Manufacture & Construction (GHG-CO ₂)	ISIC 3
Manufacture & Construction (1.A2)	Manufacture & Construction (GHG-CO ₂) plus Construction CO ₂	ISIC 6
Energy (1.A1C, 1.A5) & Fugitive Emissions (1.B)		ISIC 2
Transport (1.A3)		ISIC 8
Industrial Processes (2)		ISIC 3
Agriculture (3)		ISIC 1
Waste (4)		ISIC 5
Fuel Combustion at Source (1.A4)		ISIC 7
Others (6)	Assigned to 'other sectors' and weighted by value added of each of these sectors	ISIC 9-21


Measurement: Norms

Measures of *Norms*: High and low altruism and reciprocity

Altruism: Donation respondents give to charity after raffled Amazon gift card.



Reciprocity: Contribution respondents give to each other after raffled Amazon gift card.



Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>	0.107*** (0.018)		
<i>Altruism: High</i>	0.107*** (0.020)		
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>	-0.060*** (0.021)		
<i>GHG EmissionsXReciprocity</i>	-0.012 (0.034)		
<i>GHG EmissionsXAltruism</i>	-0.000 (0.000)		
Observations	4,007	4,008	4,008
Socio-demographics	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes

Table: *Support for Climate Cooperation and Environmentalism: Norms, Interests, and their Interactions.* OLS regression coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses). *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>	0.107*** (0.018)	0.526*** (0.111)	
<i>Altruism: High</i>	0.107*** (0.020)	0.546*** (0.119)	
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.385*** (0.128)	
<i>GHG EmissionsXReciprocity</i>	-0.012 (0.034)	0.027 (0.213)	
<i>GHG EmissionsXAltruism</i>	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.003)	
Observations	4,007	4,008	4,008
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Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>	0.107*** (0.018)	0.526*** (0.111)	-1.847** (0.789)
<i>Altruism: High</i>	0.107*** (0.020)	0.546*** (0.119)	3.332*** (0.871)
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.385*** (0.128)	-1.657* (0.909)
<i>GHG EmissionsXReciprocity</i>	-0.012 (0.034)	0.027 (0.213)	-2.650* (1.353)
<i>GHG EmissionsXAltruism</i>	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.024 (0.024)
Observations	4,007	4,008	4,008
Socio-demographics	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes

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Experimental Findings




Figure: *The Causal Effect of Costs and Reciprocity on Support for Climate Agreements.*

Experimental Findings




Figure: *The Causal Effect of Costs and Reciprocity on Support for Climate Agreements by GHG Emissions.*

Conclusion

- Global climate cooperation conflict depends on interests and norms
- Policymaking: Compensating economic losers and forming international coalitions can reduce public opposition to global climate policies.

Additional slides

Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>			
<i>Altruism: High</i>			
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>			
Observations	4,008	4,009	4,009
Socio-demographics	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes

Table: *Support for Climate Cooperation: Norms and Interests*. OLS regression coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses).

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Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>	0.103*** (0.015)		
<i>Altruism: High</i>	0.097*** (0.017)		
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>	-0.070*** (0.015)		
Observations	4,008	4,009	4,009
Socio-demographics	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes

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Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>	0.103*** (0.015)	0.536*** (0.093)	
<i>Altruism: High</i>	0.097*** (0.017)	0.503*** (0.104)	
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>	-0.070*** (0.015)	-0.401*** (0.095)	
Observations	4,008	4,009	4,009
Socio-demographics	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes

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Correlational Findings

	Support for Climate Cooperation	Importance of CO2 Reductions	Environment: Willingness to Pay
<i>Reciprocity: High</i>	0.103*** (0.015)	0.536*** (0.093)	-2.649*** (0.662)
<i>Altruism: High</i>	0.097*** (0.017)	0.503*** (0.104)	3.871*** (0.748)
<i>GHG Emissions: High</i>	-0.070*** (0.015)	-0.401*** (0.095)	-2.263*** (0.660)
Observations	4,008	4,009	4,009
Socio-demographics	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes

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


Figure: *The Causal Effect of Costs and Reciprocity on Support for Climate Agreements by Reciprocity.*

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


Figure: *The Causal Effect of Costs and Reciprocity on Support for Climate Agreements by Altruism.*