

Attitudes About Development: Experimental Evidence from Africa

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Abstract

African development encompasses a broad set of international processes and actors. Research has examined if international forms of support, like foreign aid, promote development there. Yet, no research that we know of has studied what Africans want from processes associated with international development like foreign aid or direct investment. We thus ask what Africans want from development focusing on three key areas including (i) type of financing, e.g., aid versus private investment (ii) purpose of project, e.g., democracy versus health care (iii) source of funds, e.g., western donors versus China. Hypotheses about these different dimensions of development are presented in our paper, and to test them we conducted survey experiments in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda. Results indicate that there are not strong preferences for aid versus private investment, although there is a slight preference for aid in Côte d'Ivoire and finance in Uganda. Purpose matters a lot as respondent's choose a project 34% of the time in Côte d'Ivoire and 33% in Uganda if it promotes democracy, compared with 69% and 68% respectively if it promotes health and education. Our results further indicate that in Côte d'Ivoire respondents generally prefer China less as a donor, especially among female respondents, and the same is largely true for respondents in Uganda. However, when we consider preference for donor by respondent religion we find that Muslim respondents in Côte d'Ivoire prefer the U.S. as a donor by more than eleven percentage points over China, while Christians prefer China by more than six percentage points over the U.S. and France. In Uganda, however, Muslims prefer China as a donor by 23 percentage points compared to the U.S., while Christian respondents prefer China least compared to other donors. We present these and further results in the paper, and conclude by discussing the broader implications of these findings and ideas for future research.

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1 Introduction

What do Africans want from development? What do they want from the many international development programs that prevail across the region? Despite their significance, little research to our knowledge has examined these questions in a scientific manner. More often than not, the views of Africans about the development process, especially its international aspects, have either been ignored or not examined in a rigorous manner. For the most part, however, their opinions have mainly just not been heard, primarily because donors treat recipient-governments and African people as a “homogenous aggregate of components with identical interests” (Bauer 1984, 50). In reality, these interests are not homogenous and by aggregating them we miss what Africans really want from development and the international programs dedicated to this cause. This is a significant gap in our understanding of the political economy of development, and we begin to address it in this analysis.

In political economy, and the social sciences in general, most research on development has focused on if it works. One particular area of intense examination is if foreign aid promotes growth and development (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2006; Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008; Easterly 2003; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004; Riddell 2007; Sachs 2006). This research reveals a variety of important conclusions, yet it has not asked nor considered what the people who are supposed to benefit from development programs actually want from them. In the case of Africa, where much aid and larger development programs take place, there is a conspicuous lack of understanding about (i) what people want from them and (ii) in what form/s they want these programs to occur.

To help address this gap, we ask the following questions: Do Africans prefer aid or private investment? Do they exhibit preferences for aid programs dedicated to some purposes over others? Do they want aid to promote democracy or would they rather it develop infrastructure or

build schools and hospitals? Do Africans exhibit preferences for certain donors over others? How, specifically, do Africans feel about the rise of China as a partner in many of these projects?

In this analysis, we test these questions in two African countries utilizing original survey experiments. Our experiments were conducted in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, two sub-Saharan African countries which are culturally, geographically, and politically quite different, yet both have traditionally been dependent on international assistance in one form or another.¹ What do Ivoirians and Ugandans want from aid and other aspects of development programs? Results from our survey-experiments in communities across Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda provide several important and notable results. Respondents in both countries (i) strongly disapprove of democracy as a purpose for development projects (ii) strongly approve of health and education as a purpose (iii) do not exhibit strong preferences for aid or investment (iv) do not always show a preference for or against any particular donor, including China, but do show strong preferences for certain donors across respondent's religion (v) do not generally exhibit preferences for international institutional support, amount of funding, or duration of development projects.

These findings make several contributions to the literature in international political economy (IPE) and beyond. First, by incorporating and understanding what Africans want from international development we extend the literature on globalization and development in an important new direction. While we are not the first to say that the opinions of the people in these places should be taken into consideration, we are, at least as far as we know, the first to scientifically extend the literature in political economy in this way giving the people in these places voice in the development process. To this end, our work complements and extends prior research in IPE that has examined the development effects of globalization (e.g., Mosley 2011; Rudra 2008, 2011), although here we provide a micro-level view of globalization and development adding further to our understanding of

¹Foreign aid in Côte d'Ivoire has averaged about 35% of government expenditures (2010-2014), and about 65% of expenditures in Uganda. Data is from the World Development Indicators (see NET ODA received (% of central government expense)).

these important processes. Second, we extend the literature in political science that has considered individual attitudes on trade, investment and immigration primarily so in the U.S. and Europe and other parts of the developed world (e.g., see Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). We extend this literature in important ways by considering the views of Africans who have been left out of analyses of public opinion, and also by examining processes beyond trade and immigration including foreign aid and the rise of China as a rising power on the international scene. Third, and finally, our results have important implications for the foreign policy goals of the U.S., European Union, and other western countries and organizations that have spent, and continue to spend, heavily in the quest to promote democracy abroad as in Africa. Respondents in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda, our results show, do not want democracy promoted as a part of development projects. While people in these two different countries might want democracy, and that is an open question, they certainly do not seem to want it imposed from the outside. Building on these contributions, we next present our theoretical expectations, survey design and implementation, empirical results, and a short conclusion.

2 Theoretical Expectations

2.1 Type of Finance

Historically, aid flows have represented the bulk of financial flows to Africa. Increasingly, however, private capital flows are a source of finance from abroad. Many commentators believe that moving away from aid and diversifying the source of funding is good for Africa. Moyo (2009), for example, believes that the evidence indicates aid to Africa has made the poor poorer, and the growth slower. Economists, like William Easterly, argue as well that aid, even under the rights conditions, is unlikely theoretically or empirically to be a source of growth (e.g., see Easterly 2003; Easterly, Levine,

and Roodman 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2008). Moreover, by empowering dictators, causing corruption, and impeding political freedom, aid can indirectly impede development (Easterly 2014) and thus easily be seen as an inferior source of funding, at least compared to private investment.

As an alternative to aid, foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly prevalent across the African continent. Evidence, albeit limited, shows that FDI in Africa can be good for growth (Obwona 2001). Moreover, evidence on wages in the developing world indicates that while wages associated with FDI (from the U.S.) are less than domestic wages they are normally better than what a worker could earn outside of the sectors in which FDI is used (Kabeer and Mahmud 2004). Of course, FDI is controversial in its own right, including issues of labor and environmental exploitation, but it seems fair at this point to claim that it represents financing that people in Africa want access to and are likely to prefer over aid. Given that FDI flows to Africa are more recent, along with the many controversies surrounding aid, including that it is a tool of political and social control, FDI compared to aid should be preferred amongst Africans as a source of finance. Yet, with high-profile academics like Jeffrey Sachs (2006), famous musicians and actors like Bono and Brad Pitt, and wealthy donors like Bill Gates, aid has acquired an important 'star effect' which gives it a lot of support. Despite this effect, there is likely a certain level of aid-fatigue across the sub-continent and for this and the aforementioned reasons it seems plausible that Africans will prefer FDI to aid all else equal. Based on this logic, then, the first hypothesis we test is as follows:

Hypothesis 1. Compared to aid, direct investment will be a preferred form of finance.

Extending this first claim, it seems possible that there might be gendered differences here as FDI could be favored by women more than by men. Globalization, research indicates, is positively associated with the empowerment of women. Richards and Gelleny (2007) find, for example, that globalization, and FDI specifically, is positively associated with the status of women as measured by the U.N.'s gender empowerment measure and gender development index. In Bangladesh, Kabeer

and Mahmud (2004) also find that women working in export processing zones have better economic opportunities, e.g., higher wages, than in other forms of domestic employment. If it is indeed true that FDI is beneficial for women then it seems possible that African women might support it more than aid, which does not offer them the same opportunities for employment. This leads to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. Amongst women, direct investment will be a preferred form of finance compared to aid.

2.2 Purpose

Financial flows have a purpose or goal. Foreign aid, for example, builds roads and dams, provides education and healthcare, and often promotes democracy. At least this is what donors claim it does. Private investment, likewise, is used for many of the same purposes including projects to build infrastructure, school and hospitals, and more.

Both aid and private investment are political, particularly in Africa where governments control these flows. Direct investment in Africa tends to be used for projects to extract natural resources like oil or diamonds. Investors are not only politically connected to begin with, but often engage in behavior that limits political development as elections and other freedoms are a threat to profits as labor can organize to demand higher wages, and citizens can further demand foreigners pay more taxes. Across Africa, there is a legacy of foreign firms capturing if not outright controlling political processes. Leopold's colonization of the Congo, and exploitation of its natural resources and people, is just one example of how foreign control of industries, or in this case an entire country, suppressed political development leaving a legacy of authoritarianism and corruption in its place.

Likewise, aid donors indirectly affect political processes, and often directly so as they usually have explicit political goals woven into their programs. Aid from agencies like the United States

Agency for International Development (USAID), and those in Europe, explicitly attempt to promote and support democracy in countries across much of the developing world including Africa (Finkel et al. 2007). Whether it works or not is an open debate, but we believe, more importantly, is if people in Africa want it or any development funds to be promoting democracy. Images of Africans waiting to vote in long lines reinforces views that they want democracy, which may be true, but the question here is if they want it coming from international aid donors specifically. While it seems evident to policymakers and citizens in donor countries that promoting democracy is a worthy goal, it is not at all clear that the people in Africa feel the same way. Amongst Africans there are likely serious reservations from it being imposed from the outside via aid or otherwise. Africa has a long history of political meddling largely at the hands of the same aid donors that are today pursuing these projects.

Africans are likely to be suspicious of democracy promotion, but we believe there is ultimately a desire for democracy. Since independence, Africans have been ruled by authoritarian and corrupt regimes that have done nothing to improve the lives of the average person, and in many cases people have become worse off due to poor governance. For many, then, democracy offers the opportunity for a better life as it promotes political accountability. Western governments and institutions, like the World Bank, heavily sell this idea that better governance comes from democracy where politicians are held accountable via elections, and policy is made in a transparent environment. Africans are likely then to support aid or other international donations that promote democracy because they want accountability and they see no other way to democratize without some help from outside. Elite rule is a reinforcing process and aid can help break this cycle.

Yet, the relevant question is not if Africans want aid programs to promote democracy or not, but if they want programs to promote democracy or other purposes like roads or schools. A preference for democracy is realistically one that is relative to other purposes for which funds could

be directed to like agricultural programs, building roads and power plants, schools and hospitals, and trade and tourism. Comparatively, we expect democracy promotion, while not without its faults, will be seen in a favorable light especially given the need that Africans often express for improved governance. In our sample countries, this is likely to be especially true since in Uganda Yoweri Museveni, the current president, has been in power since 1986. People there are showing strong preferences for competitive elections and democracy in general. In Côte d'Ivoire, as well, there is a similar sentiment as there has been intense political conflict over the last ten years including several civil wars. Respondents in both countries are thus likely to view democracy as a worthy cause and for these reasons we offer our third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. Democracy will be favored as a purpose for aid compared to other reasons.

2.3 Donor Country

In Africa, China's presence as a lender and development partner has dramatically changed the structure of finance across the region. Moyo argues that, "Roads in Ethiopia, pipelines in Sudan, railways in Nigeria, power in Ghana—these are just a few of the torrent of billion-dollar projects that China has flooded Africa with in the last five years" And, China, Moyo (2009, 103) claims is conquering Africa not with a gun but rather money. As a donor of both aid and other investments, much good and bad has been made of the rise of China. On one hand, people see China as a business partner that takes Africa and Africans seriously, seeking to make economically beneficial deals. According to Kuo (2016) "Europe has always misunderstood what Africans want," while China treats Africa "not as a continent in need of saving or lecturing, but as partners in a long-term business deal."² As business partners, the Chinese invest in infrastructure, hospitals, and schools, and usually demand no extra-political conditions as do other donors and business partners from

²<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-china-knows-about-africa-the-west-doesnt-16295?page=2>.

western countries.

Yet, on the other hand, Chinese investments to Africa are controversial in their own right. Increasingly reports of exploitation of labor and the environment are being heard across the sub-continent, along with complaints that FDI from China to Africa often brings Chinese labor to work there instead of hiring locals (French 2007). This is a fundamental change and often controversial part of the process as it leaves little employment for Africans and once profits are repatriated back to China the average African does not really gain much from these deals. Many Africans are increasingly “suspicious of Chinese firms, worrying about unfair deals and environmental damage.”³

Little, however, is understood about how Africans feel about China’s presence in Africa, especially as compared with other donors and development partners. Regarding the rise of China, the question, as with democracy, is not so much is China’s presence good or bad, but rather is it good compared to alternative sources of funding and support. Across the region, China invests in many projects and is delivering aid to many countries and it is doing so without the conditions that the western countries require when they send aid. Despite the controversial aspects of Chinese funding, both aid and FDI, it seems that as a relative newcomer to the region, and one that plays the game in a different manner, it should be favored to western donors. Compared to former colonizers like France and the U.K., the rise of China could be seen as relatively beneficial as it provides a new donor without the colonial ties nor one that mandates the normative prescriptions that western donors often attach to their funds.

Hypothesis 4. Compared to former colonizers like France, Germany, and the U.K., aid from China will be seen more favorably because there are less stipulations and other restrictions.

The situation with China compared to the U.S. might be different than with European donors. While it meddled there, the U.S. has not exerted the explicit control that the European

³<http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21639554-china-has-become-big-africa-now-backlash-one-among-many>.

powers did for centuries, and for this reason does not engender the suspicions amongst Africans as do the European donors. Electing Obama, moreover, has further heightened opinions of the U.S. in Africa. Comparatively, for various reasons, the U.S. tends to be very popular in Africa. While the Obama effect is likely to be spread across much of Africa, it seems most likely to be pronounced in East Africa where his father was born and raised. Views of the U.S. in Uganda should be comparatively popular, but the same should hold in West Africa although possibly not as intense as in East Africa. Because it is held in high esteem, the U.S. compared to China (and Europe) should be preferred as a donor:

Hypothesis 5. Compared to China, the U.S. will be seen as a more favorable donor.

2.4 International Institution, Amount, Duration

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, we want to place them within a context as to how development projects exist in the minds of Africans. In addition to type of financing, purpose, and source of funding, there are many factors that shape development projects in Africa. International institution presence, local partner, amount, and duration typically define these projects as well. Development projects, whether aid driven or not, often are supervised or supported to some degree by an international institution such as the World Bank or U.N., and also by a local partner such as the national government or a local non-governmental organization. Moreover, the time frame, or duration, and amount of funding are important considerations that affect how people likely view development programs. To provide a complete picture, we thus include these variables in our survey experiment. While we did not have strong expectations regarding their effects, we do offer some brief discussion and hypotheses regarding what we expected prior to collecting data.

Compared to no institutional presence, the presence of an international institution will be favored because these groups provide funds and technical advice on development that could help

ensure the project will be a success.

Hypothesis 5. Compared to no international institution presence, international institution support will be favored by respondents.

Development projects also usually include an in-country partner such as the national government, local government, or local NGO. Respondents, we thought, should be more amenable to partners at the local level and those not affiliated with the government especially the national government. Stories of corruption and waste in development projects run rampant across Africa and these are usually most common in regard to the government and its handling of the funds, and so it is likely that respondents will view actors at the local level more favorably than the national government. At the local level, people have more control and ability to resist the effects of corruption than at the national level. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding recipient agency:

Hypothesis 6. Compared to the national level of government, all other recipients will be favored as recipients of foreign aid funds.

Generally, it is expected that larger amounts of funds will be favored to less. More funding in the minds of people should mean more opportunity all else equal. Likewise, respondents should prefer shorter projects to longer ones because waiting for things to get done in Africa is a fact of life and a real burden on peoples lives there. Based on this logic, we also test the following two hypotheses as well:

Hypothesis 7. More funding will be preferred to less funding.

Hypothesis 8. Short-run projects will be preferred to long-run projects.

3 Survey Design and Implementation

To test these hypotheses, we conducted an experimental survey using a conjoint analysis or revealed preference analysis. A powerful yet simple technique, this method of data generation allows one to estimate causal effects varying several treatment components at the same time. Introduced in the early 1970s for marketing research (Green and Rao 1971), Hainmueller et al. (2013) argue that the approach is under-utilized in political science, and is especially well-suited “when researchers seek to test causal hypotheses about multidimensional preferences and decision making” (27). Using this method, experiments have been conducted in the U.S. on preferences for presidential candidates and attitudes towards immigrants.

Following this earlier work, we conducted survey experiments in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda from February to May 2016. Prior to conducting the experiments, IRB approval was obtained, and the research proposal and hypotheses were registered with the Evidence in Governance and Politics website. In our experiment, respondents were given a choice between two hypothetical projects and after evaluating the two projects were asked to indicate which project they preferred. Respondents were further asked to express and explain their overall impression of each project as either terrible, acceptable, fine, good, or excellent. Respondents also were provided the opportunity to explain what project-related variables impacted their impression before being offered an opportunity to repeat the exercise with two new evaluations. Having respondents consider projects in three different scenarios allows us to gain observations and to further vary our treatments by respondent. Following the third scenario, respondents were asked to identify their own characteristics to see if responses varied with respondent characteristics.

The survey experiment was an entirely voluntary process and respondents could refuse to answer any question or exit the survey at anytime. In consideration of their time, a small token of appreciation was offered to subjects (500 CFA in Côte d’Ivoire and 1,500 shillings in Uganda per

three scenarios completed, equivalent to about 80 cents or a soft drink). Similar to Afrobarometer, interviewers interviewed respondents of their own gender. Example surveys from Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda are provided in Figure 1.

Figure 1 here

Respondents were randomly selected according to a predetermined selection process. In this process, we randomly chose areas within the communities we were sampling and sampled in both the morning and afternoon. Within each community or area of selection, we predetermined randomized times to move around the community from site to site and at each point we asked people to participate based on a predetermined set of randomly generated set of 0s and 1s. After moving in a random direction for a predetermined time (from 10 seconds to 2 minutes), we asked the first person we saw to participate if the corresponding number was a 1 and if the number was 0 then we did not ask that person and moved on to the next person. If that number was a 0 then we moved on again to the next person, but if it was a 1 then we asked that person to participate. Our response rate was very high, over 90%, with few people declining and very few stopping the survey after it had begun.

Variables and possible responses were randomized across each experiment as was the order in which the variables were presented. Variables of interest and possible outcomes are as follows: Type of funding: Foreign aid/assistance from foreign government and its aid agencies or direct investment from private partner in foreign country. Source country: United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, China. International Institutional Support: United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Union, African Development Bank. Purpose: Infrastructure development like roads, water, and electricity; Democracy and election monitoring; Promotion of industry, mining, and construction; Promotion of agriculture, forestry, and fishing; Promotion of trade and tourism; Development of healthcare and education facilities. Partner in country: National Gov-

ernment; Regional Government; Non-governmental organization (NGO); Church, Mosque, or other local agency; Private sector entity. Value of project: \$250,000, \$500,000, \$1,000,000, \$10,000,000, \$250,000,000. Duration: The project will take 2, 5, 10, 20 years to complete.

Across Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, we sampled several communities in various parts of the country. Working in this way helped to ensure that we were not confined to one geographic area alone. Below Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the sample communities, and from where in each community we sampled specifically. Figure 2 is provided to help give an idea of where the two countries are located in Africa and where we sampled specifically. Figure 3 provides a map of the data collection sites in Côte d'Ivoire, and Figure 4 does the same for Uganda.

Figures 2, 3, and 4 here

In total, we have data from 433 respondents, 223 are from Côte d'Ivoire and 210 are from Uganda. Of the respondents from Côte d'Ivoire, 53% of them are male and 47% female, while 84% are between the ages of 18 to 39, and 10% are between 40 and 49 years of age. This demographic data is largely representative of the population in Côte d'Ivoire, and our sample closely mirrors the religious composition of Ivorian society as our respondents are 40% Christian and 41% Muslim which is consistent with the population at large there. From Uganda, of the 210 respondents 57% of them are male, and 80% are between 18 and 39 years old with 10% also between 40 and 49. For Uganda, the demographic data is consistent with the larger population, and the religious composition of our sample is 87% Christian and 13% Muslim which largely represents the population in Uganda that is reported to be 85-15% Christian-Muslim. Finally, 67% of respondents from Côte d'Ivoire and 65% from Uganda report that they come from a humble background, or one that in other words is poor.

4 Empirical Analysis

In this section, we present the results based on the experimental data collected in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda. In the first subsection we present the unadjusted results as a series of graphs, and then following this discussion we present the adjusted results using several different estimators.

4.1 Unadjusted Results

Figure 5 presents the results for the frequency with which respondents chose a project based on if it was financed by foreign aid or FDI. In Côte d'Ivoire, the top two parts of the graph, respondents modestly prefer aid over FDI and amongst women this increases to about a seven percentage point difference in frequency of support. However, in Uganda the situation is reversed and people favor FDI over aid, although again these are not substantial differences in frequency of support. For female respondents in Uganda there is about a five percentage point difference favoring FDI over aid.

Figure 5 here

When it comes to purpose, we find much more variation in preferences, some of which are consistent across both countries. In Côte d'Ivoire, displayed in the upper part of Figure 6, respondents show a strong dislike for projects promoting democracy. In this case, only 34% of the projects promoting democracy are chosen by the respondent. However, there is a sharp jump of about 12 percentage points to the next category for the environment followed by trade and tourism, infrastructure, and, finally, health and education which is chosen almost 70% of the time by respondents. Importantly, we find the same preferences for democracy and health and education in Uganda as only 32% of respondents there chose a project if it promotes democracy, whereas 68% chose a project if it is for health and education. Not only consistent with the findings for Côte

d'Ivoire, this is a sizable gap in preferences. Respondents evidently have intense preferences against democracy, but strong ones in favor of health and education.

Figure 6 here

Preferences for donor, shown in Figure 7, are also interesting and to some degree unexpected. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, amongst all respondents there is the strongest preference for the U.K. at 54% and a bit lower for France, their former colonizer, with China at 48%. However, amongst women, France falls to the lowest level of support at 44% while the U.S. is preferred almost eleven percentage points higher at 55%. China is again relatively low at 45%. Turning to Uganda, the results indicate for all respondents that China is preferred the least with the U.K., the former colonizer, the highest at 53%. Amongst women in Uganda, unlike in Côte d'Ivoire, the U.S. is preferred the least at 46% and France highest at 54%.

Figure 7 here

Preferences for donor amongst Ugandan respondents, see Figure 8, indicate that China is preferred the least amongst all respondents at 47%. Compared to Côte d'Ivoire, Ugandans do not view China favorably compared to other sources of funds like those from the U.K. which is favored the most by all respondents. For women respondents in Uganda, the results indicate they prefer the U.S. least at about 47% and France the highest at 54%.

Figure 8 here

Building on these results, we further considered if preference for donor varied by religion. Religion could matter as Muslim respondents might prefer China to the other donors which are all western and in some way part of the 'war on terror'. In many places, Muslims have been alienated by the actions of western countries in the war against radical Islam. What we find here is surprising

and unexpected, yet very important. In Côte d'Ivoire, Muslim respondents as shown in Figure 9 prefer China the least and actually prefer the U.S. by more than twelve percentage points compared to China. Amongst Christian respondents, however, France and the U.S. are at the bottom around 46% each, while China and the U.K. are at the top of the set of donors.

Figure 9 here

However, looking at Figure 10 for Uganda shows that Muslims there do not support the U.S. as a donor, and in fact support China by more than 20 percentage points. Amongst Christians in Uganda, the situation changes and China falls to the bottom while the U.S. rises by almost 15 percentage points.

Figure 10 here

The data in Côte d'Ivoire do not support the idea that Muslims are biased against western donors, but the data in Uganda does support this notion. Why? We offer two arguments. First, support amongst Muslims in Côte d'Ivoire in favor of the U.S. could be due to the fact that the current president, Alassane Outtara, is Muslim and having studied in the U.S. and worked at the International Monetary Fund he is seen as western to some degree. With this background, Muslims in Côte d'Ivoire could therefore identify with him and by extension the U.S. more favorably than in other countries like Uganda. However, another explanation, and the one we favor, lies in the composition of the Muslim community in each country. In Côte d'Ivoire, Muslims are not a minority group as they are in Uganda where they are approximately 15% of the population. In a minority Muslim country, like Uganda, Muslims might face more discrimination from majority groups, often Christian, than they do in a country like Côte d'Ivoire where they make up more of the population. Muslims as a minority thus might be more likely to show opposition to western donors for reasons

of discrimination and other forms of backlash. At this point, however, we do not know the answer to this question, but believe it is important and one for future research.

We also considered how people viewed international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and others compared to the African Development Bank (ADB). We expected that the ADB, as a more local international institution would be preferred to the other institutions which are more western both in terms of control and location. Figures 11 and 12 show these results for Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda respectively. In the former, the ADB is preferred to all other international institutions, though the gaps between them is not particularly large with the widest being about 5 percentage points. Amongst men, however, we find support for the ADB increases and that the gap grows to about 15 percentage points compared to the EU. For Uganda, in Figure 10, the ADB is preferred amongst all international institutions, and the gap is at its widest about six percentage points. Interestingly, among men in Uganda support for the ADB actually is not the highest, and is relatively low although for women (not pictured) it is quite high in Uganda. Respondents support the ADB over other international institutions, but the trend is not as large as expected and in some cases the ADB is not even the preferred choice.

Figures 11 and 12 here

4.2 Adjusted Results

In this subsection, we consider a logistic regression model presenting, in Table 1, the estimates on the log-odds ratio scale. Using the estimates in Table 1, we calculated the probability a respondent will choose a project. We were first interested in the probability a respondent will choose a project if it is funded by foreign aid. In Côte d'Ivoire, the probability a project is chosen is 51% if funded by aid with all other variables at their means, and amongst women this probability increases slightly to 53%. In Uganda, the probability a project is chosen if financed by aid is

49% again with all variables at their means. In contrast to Côte d'Ivoire, this probability amongst women falls slightly to 47% representing a six percentage point difference compared to the estimate in Côte d'Ivoire.

Based on purpose, we next compare probabilities between democracy promotion with health and education. In Côte d'Ivoire, for all respondents, the probability a project is chosen if it promotes democracy is 37% compared to 67% if it promotes health and education. Amongst Muslim respondents, this probability is 43% for democracy compared to 69% for health and education, and for Christian respondents it is 29% versus 68%. In Uganda, as the unadjusted results suggested, the situation is similar, but very different amongst Muslim respondents. For all respondents in Uganda, the probability a project is chosen if it promotes democracy is 33% and 63% if it promotes health and education. However, amongst Muslim respondents in Uganda the probability for democracy promotion falls to 30% or over 13 percentage points less than in Côte d'Ivoire.

Finally, we calculated the probability a respondent chooses a project given different donor countries. In Côte d'Ivoire, amongst all respondents the probability a project is chosen if the donor is the U.S. is 52%, 51% if it is France, 54% if it is the U.K., and 49% if it is Germany. Amongst Muslims, these probabilities increase across the board to 60%, 58%, 58%, and 52% respectively, and for Christian respondents they decrease to 46%, 44%, 52%, and 48% respectively. Comparatively, in Uganda amongst all respondents the probability a project is chosen is 51% if the U.S. is the donor, 51% if it is France, 53% if it is U.K., and 50% if it is Germany. In Uganda, however, the probabilities fall amongst Muslim respondents: if the U.S. is the donor the probability a project is chosen is only 28%, 30% if donor is France, 45% if it is the U.K., and 41% if it is Germany. Alternatively, amongst Christians these probabilities increase to 54%, 53%, 55%, and 51% respectively. Within these results there are a number of important findings, but it stands out that there is a lot of variation amongst Muslim respondents, some of which shows they favor western donors and others

which indicate they do not favor western donors.

Table 2 presents the results of a proportional odds model⁴ for the rating of projects, estimates are on the log-odds ratio scale. Using the results from Table 2, we calculate the probability a respondent rated a project one level higher. In Côte D'Ivoire, the probability a project is rated one level higher is 53% if it is funded by foreign aid and we see an increase to 57% amongst women. In Uganda, the probability a respondent gave a one level higher rating is 48% which falls slightly among women to 47%. The results for purpose mimic those found in the analysis of preference with the projects promoting democracy being rated lower and projects promoting health and education being rated higher. Specifically, the probability a project promoting democracy is rated one level higher is 40% in Côte D'Ivoire and only 29% in Uganda, based on all respondents. In women, these probability remain ostensibly the same for both countries. If the project promotes health and education, the probability it is rated one level higher is 63% in Côte D'Ivoire and 67% in Uganda. These probabilities increase when examining women only to 66% in Côte D'Ivoire and 72% in Uganda.

Other factors vary depending on sampling country. For instance, in Uganda, if the project is supported by the United Nations, the probability a respondent rated it one level higher is 42% over all and 39% in women while in Côte D'Ivoire, the probability is 55%, both over all and in women. We see a similar reverse trend between countries if the partner is the private sector. In Côte D'Ivoire, the probability a respondent rated a project partnered with the private sector one level higher is 51% over all and 56% in women. But in Uganda, the probability a respondent rated a project partnered with the private sector one level higher is 37% over all and 34% in women.

⁴The proportional odds model assumes that the odds of a respondent giving a rating one level higher are proportional across levels of the outcome. Thus a positive effect indicates the respondent is more likely to rate the project higher based on the corresponding covariate while a negative effect indicates a respondent is more likely to rate the project lower.

4.3 Sensitivity Analysis

The design of this study induces within respondent dependencies due to the repeated nature of the sampling: each respondent makes three choices with both the preference and non-preference recorded. Typically, failing to account for repeated measures in modeling will bias the results toward the null and reduce power. The results of the logistic regression model may also be subject to bias due to spatial correlations induced by the stratified sampling of specific cities within both Côte D'Ivoire and Uganda. Thus additional analyses were performed to ensure the results presented in Table 1 were robust to model misspecification.

Generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) can be used to adjust for repeated sampling of respondents as well as city-specific spatial associations. For the respondent and city-specific models, we consider a GLMM with a logit link for the binary preference outcome. In the respondent-specific model, a random intercept for respondent is included while in the city-specific model a random intercept for city is included. We also consider a model that includes both respondent-specific and city-specific random intercepts. In all three models, the estimates and significance levels were consistent with the findings in Table 1.

The forced preference design, however, gives an added level of complexity in that every respondent has three preferred-not preferred pairs which exhibit perfect dependency. This results in a within respondent association that is more complicated than that assumed by including a random effect in a GLMM. Generalized estimating equations (GEEs) allow for more general within respondent association structures while the use of the robust sandwich estimator to calculate standard errors reduces the impact of possible misspecification of said structure. Thus we implement a GEE with a logit link and an auto-regressive 1 association structure which more adequately models the perfect dependence between pairs of outcomes within a respondent. The results of the GEE are, however, also consistent with the findings of the logistic regression model. For more details on

GEEs and GLMMs, see Agresti (2012).

5 Conclusion

In this paper we examine, how people feel about development in Africa. We explore specifically how people feel about three international processes associated with international development including foreign aid and private investment, purpose, and donor type. To test our key ideas, we conducted survey experiments in Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, two very different African countries. Our results provide a number of illuminating and informative points about development. Some of these results are surprising for how consistent they are across the two countries, and others notable for how inconsistent they were across countries.

One finding in particular that is consistent in both countries is a deep preference for purpose. In short, we find that respondents care about what development projects do. Promoting democracy in both countries is strongly disliked while developing education and health are by far and away the most popular. There is thus robust evidence emerging from our data indicating that despite what governments, policymakers, and citizens in donor countries believe, people in Africa do not want international development programs to promote democracy. This is a crucial finding and provides some clue as to why past efforts to do so in developing countries, often funded by the U.S. and other wealthy countries, have had little effect and some might claim made things worse. Democracy, according to our findings, is not desirable when it is imposed from the outside, and whether it is desirable at all is a question for future research.

A finding, however, that was inconsistent across the countries was how Muslim respondents viewed donor countries. Contrary to popular perceptions, we find that Muslims do not have homogenous responses toward western countries. In some cases, we find that Muslim respondents support development programs from western donors compared to China, but in others we find they

prefer China to western donors by a large margin. These findings compete with and challenge the larger notion that Muslims think as a homogenous block when it comes to the west. Notions that there is a conflict between Islam and the west are not supported by this data.

Future research can continue to address these important questions. When it comes to religion, understanding how Muslims in particular feel about western donors seems to us to be a particularly important area of research in IPE as it has larger implications for other areas of political science and beyond. Testing these claims in a majority-Muslim country, like Senegal, and in a minority-Muslim country, like Ghana, will further help understand how Muslims view the situation and help to test the 'backlash' hypothesis more carefully. Moreover, future work can examine more specifically purposes like democracy promotion or health care. Finally, future research might unpack these categories further considering say election promotion versus corruption control in the former case, and communicable disease prevention like Ebola versus non-communicable diseases.

6 Appendix

Figure 1: Example surveys from Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda

Projets de développement hypothétique Côte-d'Ivoire

Projet A	Projet B
Les Nations Unies fournira un soutien logistique et technique Protection de l'environnement Le financement de ce projet proviendra du Royaume-Uni Une organisation Non-gouvernementale (ONG) est le principal partenaire Le Projet prendra 10 ans Aide étrangère/assistance d'un gouvernement étranger et de ses agences d'aide \$500,000 (CFA 292,500,000)	Pas de soutien institutionnel Surveillance Démocratique et électorale Le financement de ce projet proviendra des États-Unis Une entité du secteur privé est le principal partenaire Le Projet prendra 20 ans Investissement direct d'un partenaire privé dans un pays étranger \$500,000 (CFA 292,500,000)
Si vous aviez à choisir entre ces deux projets, lequel choisiriez-vous?	
Quelle note leur donneriez-vous sur une échelle de 1 à 5 avec 1=Mediocre 2=Acceptable 3=Passable 4=Bien 5=Excellent	
Dans l'ensemble, quels sont certains des caractéristiques des projets vous trouvez attirants?	
Dans l'ensemble, quels sont certains des caractéristiques des projets vous trouvez peu attirants?	

Hypothetical Development Projects in Uganda

Project A	Project B
\$250,000,000 (842,500,000,000 USH) Promotion of industry, mining, and construction Financing for this project will come from the United States African Development Bank will provide logistical and technical support The project will take 5 years to complete Direct investment from private partner in foreign country Private sector entity is primary partner in Uganda	\$500,000 (1,685,000,000 USH) Infrastructure development like roads, water, and electricity Financing for this project will come from the United Kingdom International Monetary Fund will provide logistical and technical support The project will take 10 years to complete Direct investment from private partner in foreign country Non-governmental organization (NGO) is primary partner in Uganda
If you had to choose one of these projects which would it be?	
Rate the projects on a 1 to 5 scale 1=Terrible 2=Acceptable 3=Fine 4=Good 5=Excellent	
What aspects of each project did you find attractive?	
What aspects of each project did you not find attractive?	

Figure 2: Collection Sites




Figure 3: Côte d'Ivoire Data Collection Sites



Figure 4: Uganda Data Collection Sites




Figure 5: Support for Projects by Finance Type




Figure 6: Support for Projects by Purpose




Figure 7: Support for Projects by Donor, Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 8: Support for Projects by Donor, Uganda




Figure 9: Support for Projects by Donor and Religion, Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 10: Support for Projects by Donor and Religion, Uganda




Figure 11: Support for Projects by International Institution, Côte d'Ivoire




Figure 12: Support for Projects by International Institution, Uganda




Table 1: Logistic Regression Results

	Côte d'Ivoire			Uganda		
	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Foreign Aid	0.134 (0.113)	0.284* (0.168)	0.0437 (0.158)	-0.114 (0.117)	-0.220 (0.182)	-0.0149 (0.158)
Agriculture	0.0731 (0.180)	-0.110 (0.282)	0.211 (0.242)	0.320* (0.191)	0.304 (0.289)	0.334 (0.259)
Democracy	-0.613*** (0.184)	-0.625** (0.269)	-0.590** (0.261)	-0.864*** (0.188)	-0.768*** (0.288)	-0.941*** (0.254)
Environment	-0.0893 (0.180)	-0.0542 (0.262)	-0.0706 (0.259)	-0.350* (0.192)	-0.338 (0.303)	-0.371 (0.255)
Health and Education	0.866*** (0.192)	0.962*** (0.290)	0.826*** (0.258)	0.630*** (0.192)	0.657** (0.294)	0.620** (0.257)
Trade and Tourism	0.118 (0.179)	0.248 (0.263)	-0.0125 (0.253)	-0.532*** (0.187)	-0.610** (0.285)	-0.480* (0.255)
France	0.0506 (0.179)	0.00836 (0.277)	0.105 (0.240)	0.0291 (0.184)	0.116 (0.284)	-0.0457 (0.249)
German	-0.0451 (0.183)	0.261 (0.270)	-0.372 (0.258)	-0.00301 (0.186)	-0.177 (0.293)	0.125 (0.248)
United Kingdom	0.236 (0.179)	0.144 (0.284)	0.287 (0.237)	0.183 (0.177)	-0.0348 (0.277)	0.344 (0.234)
United States	0.109 (0.176)	0.452* (0.263)	-0.236 (0.245)	0.0354 (0.187)	-0.0423 (0.291)	0.106 (0.250)
UN	0.0871 (0.196)	0.278 (0.294)	-0.139 (0.268)	-0.0924 (0.199)	-0.233 (0.304)	0.0157 (0.267)
ADB	0.165 (0.204)	0.0276 (0.304)	0.299 (0.281)	0.0453 (0.194)	0.165 (0.301)	0.0150 (0.260)
EU	-0.0554 (0.199)	0.258 (0.297)	-0.327 (0.274)	0.0522 (0.205)	-0.0472 (0.305)	0.138 (0.282)
WB	0.0833 (0.201)	0.268 (0.301)	-0.0805 (0.275)	0.0702 (0.202)	-0.164 (0.316)	0.274 (0.269)
IMF	0.0347 (0.196)	0.0432 (0.293)	0.0248 (0.267)	-0.0611 (0.205)	-0.166 (0.314)	0.0134 (0.276)
Nat. Gov.	-0.0942 (0.182)	0.0112 (0.267)	-0.160 (0.254)	-0.209 (0.185)	0.0307 (0.277)	-0.410 (0.255)
NGO	-0.110 (0.179)	0.0371 (0.266)	-0.195 (0.249)	-0.146 (0.185)	0.0465 (0.282)	-0.288 (0.252)
Private sector	-0.243 (0.180)	-0.198 (0.267)	-0.238 (0.247)	-0.443** (0.186)	-0.370 (0.287)	-0.459* (0.249)
Reg. Gov.	-0.233 (0.175)	-0.150 (0.259)	-0.288 (0.242)	-0.211 (0.182)	0.205 (0.291)	-0.497** (0.237)
Amount	0.0518 (0.0404)	0.0176 (0.0586)	0.0748 (0.0567)	0.0453 (0.0411)	0.00385 (0.0635)	0.0806 (0.0556)
Duration	-0.0248 (0.0510)	-0.0659 (0.0766)	0.00855 (0.0702)	-0.0348 (0.0534)	-0.0194 (0.0832)	-0.0601 (0.0714)
Constant	-0.201 (0.297)	-0.349 (0.447)	-0.0955 (0.413)	0.271 (0.300)	0.374 (0.465)	0.185 (0.405)
Observations	1,328	622	706	1,256	546	710

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Proportional Odds Regression for Project Rating

	Côte d'Ivoire		Uganda	
	All	Women	All	Women
Foreign Aid	0.126 (0.102)	0.283* (0.150)	-0.0619 (0.103)	-0.0975 (0.165)
Agriculture	0.154 (0.172)	0.121 (0.293)	0.300* (0.163)	0.227 (0.268)
Democracy	-0.394** (0.165)	-0.395* (0.228)	-0.874*** (0.172)	-0.869*** (0.289)
Environment	-0.0272 (0.162)	-0.0181 (0.233)	-0.301* (0.170)	-0.170 (0.233)
Health and Education	0.532*** (0.167)	0.653** (0.254)	0.696*** (0.168)	0.930*** (0.279)
Trade and Tourism	-0.102 (0.163)	0.0930 (0.245)	-0.480*** (0.173)	-0.236 (0.255)
France	-0.263* (0.155)	-0.0392 (0.237)	-0.142 (0.164)	-0.126 (0.256)
German	-0.246 (0.167)	0.0996 (0.246)	-0.00394 (0.171)	-0.179 (0.263)
UK	-0.00611 (0.162)	-0.192 (0.246)	0.179 (0.156)	-0.135 (0.256)
US	-0.108 (0.152)	0.274 (0.218)	0.0808 (0.168)	0.172 (0.280)
UN	0.185 (0.176)	0.222 (0.250)	-0.329** (0.167)	-0.446* (0.264)
ADB	0.0673 (0.188)	0.0567 (0.287)	-0.108 (0.172)	-0.417 (0.287)
EU	-0.00608 (0.194)	0.294 (0.293)	0.00349 (0.184)	-0.388 (0.287)
WB	0.0934 (0.182)	0.220 (0.253)	-0.0814 (0.176)	-0.474* (0.285)
IMF	0.105 (0.178)	-0.00471 (0.255)	-0.0567 (0.177)	-0.396 (0.284)
Nat. Gov.	0.0106 (0.161)	0.233 (0.222)	-0.135 (0.175)	-0.0103 (0.273)
NGO	-0.137 (0.156)	0.0141 (0.238)	-0.372** (0.166)	-0.487* (0.260)
Private sector	0.0326 (0.157)	0.229 (0.237)	-0.519*** (0.169)	-0.653** (0.268)
Reg. Gov.	-0.0254 (0.162)	0.222 (0.248)	-0.327* (0.170)	-0.0586 (0.265)
Amount	0.0145 (0.0356)	0.0253 (0.0531)	0.0666* (0.0357)	0.0460 (0.0552)
Duration	0.00339 (0.0462)	-0.00660 (0.0698)	-0.00362 (0.0470)	-0.0417 (0.0759)
Age respondent	0.0286 (0.0582)	0.184* (0.0993)	-0.0389 (0.0592)	-0.173* (0.0927)
Education respondent	-0.193*** (0.0522)	-0.269*** (0.0860)	-0.0688 (0.0504)	-0.134* (0.0730)
Family background respondent	0.0450 (0.0827)	0.212 (0.138)	0.00437 (0.0995)	0.140 (0.152)
Personal background respondent	0.00845 (0.0858)	0.454*** (0.160)	0.104 (0.104)	0.347** (0.168)
Observations	1,285	610	1,235	531

Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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